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Bankrupt business firms distribute property to low-priority
investors even though the firms do not fully repay high-priority in-
vestors.' That bankruptcy in this way alters contractual priorities
effectively reallocates among investors the risk of business insol-
vency.2 Commentators have roundly criticized such reallocation as
an impediment to efficient business practice.3 Recently, however, a
"risk-sharing" defense of bankruptcy reallocation has appeared in
both the law4 and finance5 literature. Risk-sharing theorists argue
that all investors in a business debtor-equity investors and credi-
tors alike-would choose to share the risk of loss from the debtor's
insolvency. 6 These theorists surmise that investors cannot agree to
share such risk, because a risk-sharing agreement is prohibitively ex-
pensive to negotiate. Therefore, the theorists conclude, bankruptcy
reallocation furnishes a mutually beneficial hypothetical bargain to
which investors would expressly agree but for transaction
difficulties.
1 For evidence or discussion, see, e.g.,John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After
Ahlers, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 963 (1989); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.Jackson, Bargaining
After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988);
Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings, 45J. FIN. 1457 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bar-
gaining over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization
Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009 (1987); Jerold B.
Warner, Bankruptcy, Absolute Priority, and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4J. FIN. ECON. 239
(1977); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990).
2 Generally a business entity is insolvent when "the sum of such entity's debts is
greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation .... 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A)
(1988).
3 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1084 ("In the context of the corporation's
bankruptcy, the public investor in a troubled corporation has no particular equitable or
legal right superior to the creditor whose debt may go unpaid. Protecting the share-
holder at a cost of injury to the creditor is often unjustifiable."); Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2 v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.)
("Unless pacts are enforced according to their terms, the institution of contract, with all
the advantages private negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized.").
4 See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989); MarkJ. Roe, Com-
mentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy ". Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV.
219 (1989); Robert E. Scott, Sharing the Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Ahlers, and Beyond, I
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 183 (1989). Cf. Lopucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 182 (risk-
sharing theory can "make one more comfortable" with breaches of contractual priority).
5 See Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy:
An Agency Theory Explanation (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell
Law Review); Michael Frierman & P.V. Viswanath, Absolute Priority and Bankruptcy
(1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
6 See, e.g., Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 158.
;,: .'i ";, -i i , Y'i'- ?.............;',. .,.......;....... .,........ \U:,.' ",-- -.-'.,.".
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Though ostensibly plausible, risk-sharing theory must over-
come a formidable obstacle: the actual bargain among investors is
not silent on how to allocate insolvency risk. That bargain, in the
form of equity and creditor contracts, expressly allocates insolvency
risk to the low-priority, or "junior" investors, i.e., to equity inves-
tors and general unsecured creditors. Thus bankruptcy reallocation
appears to conflict with the parties' express intent.
Moreover, one cannot properly attribute contractual priority to
transaction costs. Contractual priority reflects a bargain struck
within the network of contracts that comprises every firm. 7 As part
of the investors' contractual network, equity investors purchase
residual claims subordinate to those of creditors. In return, these
equity investors gain both control of the firm and the right to any
value in excess of the amount the firm owes creditors.8 Among the
firm's creditors, general creditors invest in rights to repayment that
are subordinate to rights of high-priority, usually secured "senior"
creditors. As a result, the firm, if able, pays interest to general cred-
itors at a risk-enhanced rate greater than that the firm pays the more
senior creditors. In sum, this collective scheme provides each inves-
tor with compensation for the insolvency risk it bears. The firm
compensates equity, its riskiest investment, with a boundless
residual claim. And it compensates each creditor with a claim lim-
ited inversely to the risk the creditor bears.
Risk-sharing theory, to succeed, must explain how bankruptcy
reallocation offers investors a better bargain than the carefully inte-
7 The seminal work that describes a firm as a network of contracts among investors
is R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). The firm itself is the
nexus of this network. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theoty of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 310-11
(1976). Although some view a firm as a creature of regulation as well as of contract, see
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from His-
tory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1989), no one argues that the firm is not at least in large part
a product of its constituent contracts. This Article addresses bankruptcy's treatment of
these contracts as the components of a corporation, a standard business firm. For a
comparison of the corporation to other business associations, see Larry E. Ribstein, An
Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMoRY LJ. 835 (1988). The bankruptcy of an
individual raises concerns that are beyond this paper's scope. For a description of these
concerns, see Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953,
976-91 (1981) (questioning benefits of Bankruptcy Act to consumer debtors).
8 A typical equity investor is one who owns shares of common stock. Common
stock represents the residual claim to a corporation's earnings and assets after the cor-
poration satisfies its obligations to creditors and any "preferred" stockholder with a su-
perior claim. Each share of common stock represents a portion of the residual claim
determined by the total number of shares. The common stock also ultimately controls
the firm's affairs. Each share typically carries one vote to be cast for the appointment of
the corporation's directors or for the resolution of other matters. See generally RICHARD
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 303-05 (3d ed.
1988).
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grated actual bargain that reallocation alters. This paper refutes the
possibility that risk-sharing theory can offer a successful explanation
under any set of reasonable assumptions. Because risk-sharing the-
ory has been the only outstanding defense of bankruptcy's supplan-
tation of contractual priority,9 this refutation leaves much of current
bankruptcy law without theoretical justification.
Part I of this Article first describes the basic creditors' bargain
heuristic. This model is the standard justification for bankruptcy's
general supplantation of private contract rights, most notably the
right to collect unilaterally on a debt obligation in default. The
creditors' bargain model suggests that creditors of an insolvent
debtor prefer bankruptcy's collective proceeding to individual col-
lection actions because a collective proceeding preserves a more
valuable debtor to divide among the claimants. Bankruptcy is nec-
essary, the heuristic reveals, because creditors would find it difficult
collectively to reach this efficient outcome. Part I next explains how
bankruptcy law reallocates contractual priorities among claimants,
and argues that the basic creditors' bargain model cannot extend to
justify this reallocation. Principal among bankruptcy's reallocative
provisions are compulsory reorganization rules that grant junior
claimants practical control over the bankruptcy process and allow
such claimants to coerce concessions from senior claimants.' 0
Moreover, court bias in favor of junior claimants exacerbates this
strategic advantage, and other provisions directly deny a senior
claimant's priority in whole or in part.
Part II describes how risk-sharing theory attempts to justify
bankruptcy's reallocative provisions in a way that the basic creditors'
bargain model cannot. In theory, one source of reallocation's bene-
fit is insurance against a firm's failure from a "coinmon disaster."
9 Risk-sharing theory is not the only defense of bankruptcy reallocation. A more
amorphous defense is based on what some perceive to be general principles of equity
and fairness. For example, Elizabeth Warren argues that bankruptcy's equal treatment
of claimants, regardless of contractual priority, may bejustified inasmuch as it provides a
fair resolution for all claimants and softens the blow for those least able to bear the loss
from the firm's failure. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CmI. L. REV. 775
(1987). This justification is problematic because junior and senior claimants are not
similarly situated and therefore need not be treated equally. These claimants have ex-
plicitly bargained for precisely the unequal treatment that bankruptcy equates. And
there is no reason to think that junior claimants are any less able to bear loss than senior
claimants. In fact, senior claimants may have become senior because they are less able
to bear loss. See infra Part III. Thus bankruptcy's reallocative effect is fair only if such
reallocation would be proper between creditors who have bargained for unequal treat-
ment. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A
Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 815 (1987). See infra note 167 for a critique of a
related defense.
10 In this Article the phrase "claimant" includes an individual or entity to whom a
firm owes an obligation. This includes equity investors even though bankruptcy jargon
often limits "claimants" to creditors.
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This insurance guarantees that no claimant bears too large a share
of the losses from such a disaster. Risk-sharing theory adds an addi-
tional hypothesis, that reallocation produces benefits by reducing
investors' conflict on or after the "eve" of bankruptcy. On the eve
of an insolvent debtor's bankruptcy, junior claimants have little to
lose and much to gain if they invest the debtor's assets in a risky
venture. Thus the junior claimants have an incentive to take unto-
ward risks with the troubled firm's assets. Senior claimants, in con-
trast, bear the risk that such an investment will fail and do not share
the junior claimants' incentive. Risk-sharing theory presumes that
bankruptcy reallocation reduces the junior claimants' perverse in-
centive, because reallocation grants junior claimants a stake in the
insolvent debtor.
Part III begins a critique of risk-sharing theory by discussing
the potentially enormous costs that bankruptcy reallocation can im-
pose. Because all investors bargain with full knowledge of bank-
ruptcy's reallocative provisions, reallocation does not force a wealth
transfer from or to any investor. Bankruptcy reallocation, however,
does impose efficiency costs that are commonly underestimated.
First, researchers have traditionally focused too narrowly on direct
bankruptcy costs such as attorneys' and accountants' fees, while they
ignore costs from delay and uncertainty, which may dwarf the direct
costs. Second, commentators underestimate total bankruptcy costs
when they myopically attribute to reallocation positive insolvency
incentives, while failing to recognize that reallocation creates per-
verse incentives that precede, and can cause, financial distress.
These perverse incentives exist when the debtor is solvent, because
bankruptcy reallocation makes the prospect of insolvency less oner-
ous to junior claimants. Third, descriptions of bankruptcy costs ex-
clude costs incurred by firms that adopt inefficient capital structures
in response to bankruptcy's reallocative provisions.
In its conclusion, Part III identifies two reasons why the collec-
tive benefits from bankruptcy reallocation cannot outweigh its col-
lective costs. First, the benefits from bankruptcy reallocation accrue
only to junior investors that are undiversified or relatively more sen-
sitive to insolvency risk than are a debtor's senior investors. Risk-
sharing theory overstates this class of beneficiaries because it misap-
plies risk-aversion analysis. Second, contractual and less pervasive
compulsory alternatives to bankruptcy's actual reallocative provi-
sions can produce all plausible risk-sharing benefits at lower cost.
Thus the Article concludes that bankruptcy's reallocative provi-
sions, including bankruptcy reorganization, its most pernicious real-
location vehicle, lack justification and that Congress should abolish
them. The abolition of bankruptcy reorganization and kindred pro-
19921 443
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visions would greatly simplify and reduce the price of the insolvency
process. Alternatively, courts properly sympathetic to contractual
priorities should interpret extant law to remove bankruptcy's reallo-
cative bias.
I
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE BASIC CREDITORS'
BARGAIN
Bankruptcy law alters contracts between creditors and their
debtor. Basic creditors' bargain theory defends bankruptcy's inter-
ference with actual contracts on the ground that a "hypothetical
contract" among all creditors prohibits enforcement of individual
collection remedies that would work to the creditors' collective dis-
advantage. However, even if one accepts this hypothetical contract
theory, in practice bankruptcy law interferes with contractual priori-
ties as well as collection rights, and thus exceeds whatever justifica-
tion the basic theory can provide.
A. The Basic Creditors' Bargain Heuristic
At its core, bankruptcy supplants debt collection remedies of
individual creditors with a "collectivized debt collection device."'"
In theory, bankruptcy's collective proceeding is superior to individ-
ual creditor actions, because individual creditors have perverse in-
centives to act in their own interests, even if such action would
disserve creditors' collective interest. Thus bankruptcy is beneficial
to the extent it protects creditors from their own worst instincts.' 2
To illustrate, assume a debtor firm operates a business with as-
sets worth $500,000 as a going concern, but only $440,000 if sold
piecemeal. That is, the assets are more valuable as parts of the
debtor's business than if separately distributed to other businesses.
Assume further that the debtor owes a total of $800,000 to general
creditors-$80,000 to each of ten such creditors-and that the
debtor is in default on its obligations. Because the debtor lacks suf-
ficient assets to pay all creditors in full, each creditor has an incen-
tive to collect its debt before the other creditors. This race to the
assets will likely divide the assets piecemeal, with each race winner
taking a piece of the debtor large enough to satisfy its own claim. As
a result, the creditors collectively will take assets worth only
$440,000 from the debtor. The creditors would prefer to sell the
debtor's assets intact for $500,000, but each creditor knows that it
may not obtain any of the debtor's assets if it waits for every creditor
II THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7 (1986).
12 See generally id. at 1-19.
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to find every other and agree to act collectively. This dilemma of
coordination and game theory is known as the common-pool
problem.13
Bankruptcy disallows individual creditor action' 4 and cures the
common-pool problem. A bankruptcy court supervises the use and
disposition of the debtor's assets and holds the assets together if
together the assets are most valuable.' 5 The court will then divide
the value of the assets among creditors in an orderly fashion, either
through the sale of the assets to a third party and distribution of the
sale proceeds,' 6 or through distribution of interests in a debtor
freed from prebankruptcy obligations.' 7 An individual creditor
never has an opportunity to withdraw vital assets. In the illustration
above, for example, the bankruptcy court would prohibit individual
creditor action and could sell the debtor's business as a going con-
cern for $500,000. This would preserve the debtor's going-concern
surplus. Such banikruptcy intervention is thought to reflect the "hy-
pothetical creditors' bargain," or the solution the creditors would
reach could they solve their coordination and strategy problems.' 8
As such, bankruptcy's solution to the common-pool problem is the
chief justification for compulsory supplantation of individual credi-
tor remedies. 19
'3 Id. at 10-12.
14 A bankruptcy petition automatically stays any individual creditor action against a
debtor with respect to pre-petition claims. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
15 The Bankruptcy Code contains a number of provisions designed to maximize the
value of the debtor as a going concern. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988) (the court super-
vises transactions outside the ordinary course of business); id. § 721 (court may author-
ize the bankruptcy trustee to operate the business of the debtor if such operation is in
the best interest of the estate); id. § 1108 (in a reorganization proceeding the trustee or
the debtor may operate the business of the debtor unless the court orders otherwise).
16 See id §§ 725, 726.
17 See id. § § 1101-1 174. See infra part I.B. for a further explanation of these bank-
ruptcy reorganization provisions.
18 This illustration is simplistic. In an actual case, bankruptcy's solution to the
common-pool problem may yield subsidiary benefits. These include the elimination of
costs of the avoided race to the debtor's assets, and the provision of a common forum
for disputes over those assets. These cost savings must be compared to the cost of the
bankruptcy process, which in this illustration is assumed to'be less than the creditors'
collection costs. For a comprehensive description of the basic hypothetical bargain
model, see JACKSON, supra note 11, at 1-19.
19 This view, though widely accepted, is not necessarily correct. A neutral legal
environment that permits firms meaningfully to opt out of bankruptcy could prompt
virtually all firms to solve the collective action problem with contracts prior to any inves-
tor's contribution of capital. Thus bankruptcy would be unnecessary. This discussion is
left for another day. See Barry E. Adler, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Bankruptcy
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review) (multi-priority con-
tractual hierarchy could replace bankruptcy). In any case, even if one accepts that gen-
eral benefits accrue from bankruptcy's collective proceeding, such a proceeding is not
necessarily ideal for all issues in all bankruptcies. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Bankruptcy
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B. Bankruptcy's Reallocative Provisions
Although nothing in the basic creditors' bargain heuristic sug-
gests that bankruptcy should affect contractual priorities among
claimants to the debtor's assets, bankruptcy has myriad ways to ef-
fect such reallocation. These include provisions for reorganization
and provisions that directly deny priority.
1. Bankruptcy Reorganization
Bankruptcy reorganization 20 provides a potent vehicle for the
reallocation of contractual priorities. In principle, reorganization is
benign and merely skips a step in bankruptcy's resolution of an in-
solvency. In the previous illustration, for example, the court could
have the debtor issue 500,000 shares of common stock2' ratably to
the creditors in partial satisfaction of the creditors' aggregate
$800,000 in claims, which the court would then discharge. 22
Prebankruptcy equity investors, contractually last in line,23 would
receive nothing. Each share would be worth $1, less the related
share of bankruptcy expenses, and if bankruptcy reorganization and
auction expenses are the same, each creditor would own an interest
in the reorganized debtor equal in value to the cash the creditor
would have received had the court auctioned the firm on the open
market and distributed the sale proceeds. 24 Reorganization avoids
the auction step and accomplishes essentially a sale of the debtor to
its creditors. 25 The situation would change little if the creditors did
not share the same priority level. For example, if one creditor held
a perfected security interest in collateral worth $80,000, the amount
of its claim, it would hold a contractual entitlement to priority over
unsecured creditors in that amount. 26 The secured creditor, there-
and the Administrative State, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 1567 (1991) (bankruptcy forum inappropri-
ate for adminstrative law issue resolution).
20 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
21 See supra note 8.
22 See I1 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988).
23 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
24 The text's illustration may be generalized. In the absence ofexceptional circum-
stances, the creditors must be indifferent to a cash sale or share distribution, because the
creditors can achieve whatever combination of stock ownership and cash they prefer
simply through the sale or purchase of shares on the market. Cf Franco Modigliani &
Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theoiy of Investment, 48 AM.
ECON. REv. 261 (1958) (noting investors' ability to leverage their interests in an all eq-
uity firm).
25 As Baird describes this conception: "The difference between a liquidation and a
reorganization is that the first involves an actual sale of all the assets of a business to a
third-party buyer and the second involves a hypothetical one." Douglas G. Baird, The
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 139 (1986).
26 All states except Louisiana have adopted Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), which allows a secured creditor to establish a priority property interest in
[Vol. 7/7:439446
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fore, could receive 80,000 shares and the other creditors 420,000
shares collectively. Thus, in fundamental conception, reorganiza-
tion would not upset contractual priority.27
In practice, however, reorganization does not easily follow this
pattern. Because reorganization does not involve a public auction, a
bankruptcy court does not know the value of the firm in which it
must distribute interests. Consequently, if the claimants to the
debtor possess different priorities, the court must oversee and, if
necessary, resolve a negotiation among claimants who have different
opinions about the debtor's value. Assume, for example, that a
debtor owes a fully secured creditor $100 and owes a number of
unsecured creditors a total of $200. In a reorganization negotia-
tion, the secured creditor might argue that the debtor is worth $200
and that it should receive half of the interest in the reorganized
debtor. The unsecured creditors might argue that the debtor is
worth $300 and that they should receive two-thirds of the interest in
the reorganized debtor. This debate, moreover, is not limited to
creditors. Prebankruptcy equity investors might argue that, despite
the bankruptcy, the debtor is solvent, worth $400, and thus equity
should receive one-fourth of the interest in the reorganized debtor.
These positions are mutually inconsistent, and the court would have
to set a value as part of a reorganization plan.28 If the court errs and
overvalues the debtor, the process reallocates contractual priority in
favor of the low-priority, or "junior," claimants. If the court errs
and undervalues the debtor, the bias works in favor of the high-pri-
ority, or "senior," claimants.
. The prospect of erroneous valuation does not necessitate a
reallocative system. If the reorganization process yields as much
overvaluation as undervaluation, the system provides unbiased,
though not error free, enforcement of contractual priority. And if
the reorganization process is less expensive than an auction, this
might be desirable.29 However, bankruptcy reorganization bears lit-
te resemblance to this balanced model of valuation dispute resolu-
tion. It is instead a valuation system that, in practice if not by
design, favors junior claimants at the expense of both senior claim-
collateral, provided that the secured creditor explicitly contracts for that interest and
perfects it through public notice. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-401 (1989); see also Douglas G.
Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1983)
(discussing benefits of notice filing).
27 See I I U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), (b)(2) (1988) (establishing presumptive priority of
secured over unsecured creditors, and of creditors over equity, in a reorganization).
28 See generally id. § 1129.
29 Judge Easterbrook suggests that this is possible. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is
Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27J. FIN. EcON. 411, 416 (1990). But see infra notes 123-28
and accompanying text.
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ants and all investors collectively. This bias results from a negotia-
tion framework that allows junior claimants to wage a war of
attrition, a dispute resolution system that fails to adequately safe-
guard senior claimants' rights and the duration of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings (a consideration ignored in the simple illustrations above).
The war of attrition between junior and senior claimants is
waged, and won, primarily by prebankruptcy equity investors. The
concept is simple. If a reorganization concludes while a debtor is
insolvent-that is, debt obligations exceed total asset value-
equity's residual claim has no contractual right to an interest in the
reorganized firm. 30 Faced with the prospect of no payout, equity
favors delay for two reasons. First, delay allows the firm to operate
longer while the firm is insolvent but prior to final resolution of the
bankruptcy, and thus prolongs the opportunity for a reversal of for-
tune large enough to return the firm to solvency and return equity
investors to a stake in the firm. If equity can control the firm, more-
over, it can increase the risk of the debtor's investments and thereby
enhance this opportunity. However unlikely the reversal of fortune,
and whatever the cost to creditors of the protraction-directly or
from investment risk unjustified by expected return3'---equity gains
30 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(6), 1129(a)(7), (b)(1), (b)(2) (1988).
31 To illustrate, suppose a firm has $90 in assets and $100 in debt obligations. As-
sume management owns all of the firm's equity and has an opportunity to invest $20 of
the firm's assets in a project with a negative expected return, but with a small chance to
earn $20 in profit-a chance that by hypothesis is more than offset by the probability of a
loss. If distribution of the firm's value to its creditors and discharge of management are
imminent, management will have the debtor invest in the project. Any chance of the $20
profit, which would return the firm to solvency, is an alternative superior to the status
quo for the managers, who have no chance of a return if they forego the investment.
The creditors, of course, would prefer that the firm not invest the assets in this unwise
venture. Moreover, the venture is ill-advised not only from the creditors' perspective
but from the claimants' collective perspective. From this perspective, the project has a
negative expected return. For a more involved discussion of claimants' divergent incen-
tives within a firm, see Coase, supra note 7; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory
of the Finn, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7, at 329-30;
Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. EcON. Ruv. 1032
(1963). See also Roe, supra note 4, at 234 (noting that ifjunior claimants need not com-
pensate senior claimants for pendency use of the firm's assets, the "assets might not be
deployed effectively because the equity holder or ajunior creditor will have an incentive
to delay the proceedings").
Compare the argument of Jackson and Scott that creditors have an incentive to
liquidate an insolvent debtor's profitable investments because the creditors' benefits from
any investment are limited by the amount the debtor owes them, while the creditors'
costs are limited only by the assets invested. Jackson and Scott reason that creditors
would prefer to liquidate even a positive value investment, distribute the debtor's value,
and reinvest the assets on their own so that the creditors would garner full benefits as
well as suffer any losses from the investment. See Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 169
n.27. Although Jackson and Scott are correct about these incentives, their observation
does not constitute an efficiency argument to prolong prebankruptcy management's
control of the debtor after bankruptcy. When a quick resolution of an insolvent debtor's
[Vol. 77:439448
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from prolongation of its option on the firm's value.3 2 Second, the
costs of the protracted procedure itself provide equity with an ad-
vantage. Even without a realistic hope that the debtor will become
solvent, equity can impose the costs of delay until it wrests an extra-
contractual settlement from senior claimants. Equity, if able, may
hold the debtor hostage and allow it to deteriorate in order to ex-
tract ransom from the debtor's contractual owners, the creditors.
Equity's desire for delay is meaningful, of course, only if it has
an agent to serve its interests. The debtor's management may act as
that agent. The tie between equity and management has two
sources. First, as entrepreneurs, or in order to bond themselves to
serve the interests of nonmanagement equity investors, managers
often own equity interests in their firms.33 Second, whether or not
they own equity interests, managers owe equity investors legally en-
forceable fiduciary duties.34 Management, therefore, has an incen-
tive to serve equity.
That incentive is not absolute. Nonmanagement equity inves-
tors prefer riskier debtor investment than do managers who fear
that insolvency could cause dissolution or a shift of ultimate control
to creditors. Either event could cost the managers their jobs,35 and
these jobs almost always include a firm-specific human capital in-
bankruptcy places the debtor's assets in the hands of the creditors, the incentive to liqui-
date a profitable investment vanishes with prebankruptcy equity's ability to capture the
upside of such investment.
32 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81
J. POL. EcON. 637 (1973).
33 In a seminal article on firm organization, Alchian and Demsetz explain that man-
agers-the monitors of other firm participants and directors of firm production-will
have the greatest possible incentive to maximize firm income if the managers are the
sole residual claimants. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972). It follows that if manag-
ers are not the sole residual claimants, a second-best solution is to compensate manag-
ers with equity interests so that a significant portion of their wealth is tied to the fortunes
of the firm and their incentives are aligned with those of equity. Such compensation
exists in fact. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top Manage-
ment Incentives, 98J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990) (decries managers' equity investment as in-
sufficient, but notes its existence). To the extent that equity interest compensation to
managers is only second-best, firms, even large firms, which are ordinarily widely held,
can attempt to place the entire residual claim in the hands of management. See Michael
C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 68.
34 See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESs AssOCIATIONs 411-561 (2d ed. 1990).
35 See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes
in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990) (study
shows firms that reorganize after insolvency replace their chief executive officers 56% of
the time).
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vestment independent of equity value.36 Some managers, therefore,
may occasionally share creditors' interests.3 7
Nevertheless, even prior to insolvency and outside bankruptcy,
in many firms the managers' equity investments are large enough
and their fiduciary duties are strong enough to align management
and equity interests.38 After insolvency, and once inside bank-
ruptcy, that incentive not only persists but is enhanced, because
when bankruptcy's potential effect on the managers' jobs becomes
real, managers' interests in the debtor are pared to their equity in-
vestments and abilities to use the reorganization process to prolong
their employment or to exact other personal benefits.3 9 Bankruptcy,
moreover, does not extinguish management's fiduciary duty to eq-
uity, despite insolvency and the creditors' displacement of equity as
the claimants that bear the debtor's marginal costs. This fiduciary
duty limits the extent to which managers can use bankruptcy to ben-
efit themselves but not equity.40 Thus the management of a bank-
rupt debtor has a desire .to serve equity, 41 a desire mitigated only by
the perhaps tenuous scrutiny of other firms that may be in the mar-
ket for the managers' future services.
The reorganization process is fertile ground for management's
desire to serve equity. In most instances, management retains con-
36 See RIs-nIN, supra note 34, at 529 (suggesting that firms benefit from human
capital investment); Jensen & Murphy, supra note 33, at 228-32 (salaries invariably in-
clude fixed salary component). See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of
Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL SrUD. 683 (1980).
37" Cf. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 150 (managers often act to benefit them-
selves directly, rather than to benefit equity generally and themselves only diffusely).
38 It is a small step to conclude that management's incentive to serve a firm's eq-
uity, inside or outside bankruptcy, is directly related to the portion of the managers'
wealth from equity interests in the firm. Thus some commentators are surprised that
firms do not compensate senior managers so that they become more heavily invested in
the firms they manage. See Michael C.Jensen & KevinJ. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not
How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138. EvenJensen and
Murphy, however, do not argue that managers' investments are a trivial portion of the
managers' wealth. They focus instead on the trivial nature of the total outstanding eq-
uity in the hands of managers. The focus of their concern, then, is not relevant to
whether managers can help themselves if they help equity.
39 The text assumes that managers hold equity interests to the exclusion of, or at
least disproportionately to, any ordinary credit investment they might hold. This as-
sumption appears to underlie the empirical work on management compensation. See,
e.g., Jensen & Murphy, supra note 33, at 225 (catalogs executive compensation packages
and does not list debt securities as a component).
40 See Saxon Indus. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298, 1299 (Del. 1984). This case
is discussed in LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 161-62.
41 LoPucki and Whitford studied a number of bankruptcy proceedings that reorga-
nized widely-held debtors and concluded that "in many of the reorganization plan nego-
tiations studied, management did propose that equity share in the distribution, and
creditors acquiesced." LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 151.
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trol of the debtor throughout the reorganization. 42 With control,
management has a right to exclude creditor plans of reorganization
for 180 days.43 Thus, for half a year, management, with its valuation
and distribution proposals, can deprive each creditor of any mean-
ingful opportunity to present other creditors to the court. During
reorganization, management can attempt to risk the debtor's assets
though its discretion is somewhat limited by court supervision.44
Even after the exclusive period expires, management can object to
the valuation and distribution set forth in any creditor plan and
thereby slow the process through litigation that presses the credi-
tors to offer satisfactory concessions. 45
Though most prominent, equity's strategic alignment with
management is not reorganization's only bias in favor of junior
claimants. Equity can participate directly in valuation contention,
for example, through an equity committee.46 The committee can
complicate the valuation process with a proffer of new property for
an interest in the reorganized debtor. That the court must assess
42 Bankruptcy law presumes that management will stay on as the "debtor in posses-
sion" during reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988) (providing that the court
appoint trustee to manage the debtor, only after a request and only after notice and
hearing). Indeed, Warren and Westbrook note that one of the profound changes in the
current Bankruptcy Code, adopted in 1978, is the establishment of the presumption
"that the debtor (i.e., existing management) should remain in possession absent strong
reasons for appointment of a [trustee]." ELIZABETH WARREN &JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE
LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 397 (1986).
43 See I 1 U.S.C. § 1121 (b), (c) (1988). The Code grants this exclusive period to the
"debtor." When the debtor is a corporation, the Code's reference to "debtor" is a ref-
erence to management. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471
U.S. 343 (1985). The Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1988), provides an exception that
allows others to propose a reorganization plan within management's "exclusive" period,
but only if the court gives permission after notice and hearing. The same notice and
hearing, moreover, can yield an extension of the exclusive period.
44 See I 1 U.S.C. § 363 (1988) (court must approve any transaction outside the ordi-
nary course of business). But legal limitations are amorphous and difficult to police at
best.
45 For an early explanation of why senior claimants accept breaches in absolute
priority, see William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the
State, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 37 (1977). For a formal model of the phenome-
non, see Yaacov Z. Bergman &Jeffrey L. Callen, Opportunistic Underinvestment in Debt Rene-
gotiations and Capital Structure, 29J. FIN. ECON. 137 (1991). For an anecdotal account of
creditors who accept concessions to equity outside bankruptcy, consider the plight of the
troubled financier Donald Trump. Trump, who owns the equity in his debtor enter-
prises, threatened creditors with bankruptcy if they did not agree to reduce the debtors'
obligations. In turn, the Trump debtors' junior creditors used the same bankruptcy
threat to pry concessions from Trump's senior creditors so that they all could share in
the concessions to Trump. One creditor's agent explained why his principal conceded
to Trump's request: "This country is totally pro-debtor. So it's better for us to give him
a little more money now with the chance of getting a lot more back later." Milo Geyelin
& Neil Barsky, Single, 10-Letter Word Pressured All to Set Trump's Bailout. Bankruptcy, WALL
ST. J., June 27, 1990, at A2.
46 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
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any such equity proffer 47 exacerbates delay and increases the chance
for valuation error.48 Moreover, junior creditors can use their own
committee 49 to delay the valuation and distribution process and to
gain concessions from senior creditors. Thus, reorganization's ne-
gotiation framework offers many opportunities for the reallocation
of contractual priorities. 50
Even if junior claimants are unsuccessful in their attempts to
return the debtor to solvency or to gain voluntary concessions from
all senior claimants, access to judicial dispute resolution offers the
junior claimants alternative strategies. The court, for example, can
confirm a reorganization plan that distributes property to equity,
even over the objection of a creditor who will not be repaid in full, if
a majority of creditors by number, and two-thirds by claim value,
similarly situated to the dissenter, approve the plan.5 1 A dissenter is
protected only to the extent that the plan provides the dissenter
with at least as much as it would have received had the court liqui-
dated the debtor piecemeal. 52 Despite their contractual priority,
then, creditors are not entitled to a debtor's going-concern surplus,
and under the rules of reorganization, equity need not gain volun-
tary concessions from all senior claimants that equity seeks to
impair.
The process also offers other strategic advantages if the junior
claimant convinces a court to overvalue a debtor. For example, a
47 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods., Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-19 (1939). As a
right of equity this contribution rule may be contrary to the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b) (1988). See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
48 If equity proffers a contribution of new value, it hopes that the court will under-
value the debtor, an unusual position for a junior claimant.
49 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
50 There is some evidence to support the conclusion that management's and eq-
uity's power to alter priorities derives from the reorganization process and not from
bankruptcy generally. In a recent study by Lawrence Weiss, a majority of firms that
liquidated but only a small percentage of firms that reorganized distributed assets in full
compliance with nonbankruptcy contractual priorities. Weiss, supra note 1, at 300-312.
This suggests that when management or equity is unable to propose a credible plan of
reorganization-when the firm has no going-concern surplus-it often must accept the
fate of its contractual priority. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988) (court may not con-
firm a reorganization plan of a nonviable debtor).
51 See 11 U.S.C. 99 1122, 1126, 1129(a)(7)-(8) (1988).
52 Generally, piecemeal value limits the dissenter's entitlement. Liquidation value,
however, the Bankruptcy Code's referent, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988), could as easily
be value from the sale or liquidation of the debtor as a going concern. See Thomas H.
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE U.J.
857, 893 (1982). But see Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative
Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUr. 311 (1991) (noting that
outside bankruptcy the actual outcome of a strategic contest between equity and credi-
tors would not necessarily provide creditors with full going-concern value because man-
agement equity could force concessions).
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court could confirm a reorganization plan that distributes property
to equity over the objection of an entire class of similarly situated
creditors who do not receive full cash repayment. This can occur if
another class of creditors that are to receive property other than full
cash repayment under the plan approves the plan, and if the court
finds that the plan provides the dissenting class with an interest in
the debtor equivalent in value to full cash repayment. 53 In theory,
such confirmation is not part of junior claimant strategy, but is a
safeguard against senior claimant strategy. That is, the court is per-
mitted to conclude that the dissenting class's objection is a perni-
cious attempt to hold out for a cash payment-which may be
expensive for the debtor to raise, given the demands for informa-
tion made by potential outside investors--or for additional noncash
property to which the dissenters are not entitled. 54 This scenario of
senior claimant skullduggery, however, is implausible because the
threat to the debtor-the cost the debtor must bear in a sale of as-
sets or interests in the debtor to raise the cash repayment-is proba-
bly insufficient to extort much value. 55 It is far more likely that a
class dissents because a reorganization plan gives it an interest in an
overvalued debtor. Given evidence that courts systematically over-
value debtors,5 6 confirmation over class dissent provides realloca-
tion that favors junior claimants.
Reorganization offers yet another, more subtle, opportunity for
reallocation. A court can confirm a reorganization plan that distrib-
utes property to equity over the dissent of a creditor whose claim
the plan reinstates against the reorganized debtor notwithstanding
53 The text generalizes the statutory test. For details as they relate to secured and
unsecured creditors, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1124, 1129(a)(10), 1129(b)(2) (1988).
54 See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACr OF 1978, H. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 414 (1978Y ("One requirement applies generally to all classes
before the court may confirm under this subsection. No class may be paid more than in
full.").
55 Brealey and Myers observe that the price that underwriters charge to sell a firm's
securities varies directly with the riskiness of those securities. BREALEY & MYERS, Supra
note 8, at 334 (comparing results in Clifford W. Smith, Alternative Methods for Raising
CapitaL" Rights Versus Underwritten Offerings, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 273 (1977), with results in
1960-1969: A DECADE OF CORPORATE AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 18 (Roger Hillstrom
& Robert King, eds. 1972). Because those fees are modest to begin with (as low as 3%
of sale proceeds), if a debtor is truly solvent, equity should bear little expense in the sale
of relatively low-risk securities that are senior to those which management or equity
proposes that equity retain.
56 See, e.g.,J. Ronald Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of Credi-
tors or Stockholders?, 21 UCLA L. REV. 540 (1973); WalterJ. Blum, The Law and Language of
Corporate Reorganizations, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 577-78 (1950). See also In re Nite Lite
Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 373 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (court does not rely on market value
despite creditor dissent). Cf In re Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849, 855 (Bankr. D. N.J.
1988) ("The real value or market value is determined by the bids, but it must be noted
that Section 1129(a)(7) does not address market value.").
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the debtor's default on that claim.57 The plan must cure default on
a scheduled payment, but need not honor the creditor's right to ac-
celerate repayment of the principal. 58 Once again, one could tell a
story of creditor dissent as opportunistic behavior. But it is more
likely that the creditor dissents because continuation of its original
loan terms puts the creditor in a worse position than if the court
honored its right to accelerated payment. This would occur if the
reorganized debtor was a poorer credit risk than the debtor at the
time the creditor made the loan. 59
2. Direct Denial of Priority
Reorganization may be the most important, but is not the only
means through which bankruptcy reallocates contractual priorities.
Another means of reallocation might be called reallocation by fiat.
One example of this is the denial of pendency investment income to
secured creditors. A secured creditor contracts for the right to fore-
close on its collateral in satisfaction of default on a secured loan. By
contract and in nonbankruptcy law, the secured creditor is free to
reinvest the collateral value immediately after a foreclosure.60
Bankruptcy's collective nature necessarily stays the secured credi-
tor's foreclosure right, which is a unilateral action.61 But no feature
of the collective process requires a secured creditor to sacrifice the
value of its foreclosure right. In theory, the secured creditor's prior-
ity claim should include any foregone reinvestment income that
would have accrued between the time the secured creditor could
have foreclosed, but for bankruptcy, and the time the bankruptcy
process actually concludes. In fact, junior claimants need not reim-
burse a secured creditor for such income. 62 General creditors or
equity investors gain the value from the debtor's use of the secured
creditor's property.
Another example of direct reallocation arises from the principle
of equitable subordination. 63 In original design, equitable subordi-
nation demotes claims of a debtor's insiders who illicitly manipulate
57 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124, 1126(f) (1988).
58 See id. § 1124(2)(A).
59 See Walter J. Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligations Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 430 (1985).
60 See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to 9-504 (1989).
61 See I1 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
62 This is the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 1I U.S.C.
§ 502 (1988). See United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, 484
U.S. 365 (1988).
63 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988).
[Vol. 77:439454
RISK ALLOCATION
the debtor for personal gain.64 In practice, however, at least some
courts subordinate claims of arms-length creditors whose failure to
extend or continue credit to the troubled debtor constitutes the "in-
equitable conduct." This failure may be actionable even though the
creditor has no contractual obligation to extend or continue
credit.65 Therefore, subordination, or its threat, reallocates to eq-
uity or other creditors some of the creditors' contractual rights to
withhold or withdraw capital.
Related to equitable subordination is the bankruptcy court's
power to reinstate or assign an executory contract. The court re-
tains this power whether or not the contract excuses performance in
the event the debtor's financial condition weakens and, ordinarily,
regardless of any clause that excuses performance if the debtor at-
tempts to assign its rights under the contract.6 If the debtor's only
default under the contract is its own troubled financial condition,
the debtor may assume the contract without any assurance of future
performance. 67 The debtor's equity investors or creditors then cap-
ture the nonbreaching party's contractual right to terminate and
avoid the risk of the debtor's future breach. If the debtor chooses to
assign the contract, the assignee must give the party adequate assur-
ance of future performance. 68 But the debtor's equity investors or
creditors capture the party's contractual right to reject such assur-
ances as inadequate and to terminate the contract. Thus bank-
ruptcy's reallocative features can be both subtle and pervasive. 69
64 For a seminil case on the principles of equitable subordination, see Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); see also In re CTS Truss Inc., 868 F.2d 146, 148-49 (5th Cir.
1989) (collecting cases).
65 See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); In re
American Lumber Co., 5 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980). But see Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990), in which the court,
through Judge Easterbrook, held that equitable subordination is inappropriate when a
creditor is not in breach of contract. See also In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 893 F.2d
693 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that equitable subordination is an inappropriate remedy
when the creditor has not engaged in improper conduct). Unfortunately, cases such as
KM.C. and American Lumber require attention to the contrary outcome described in the
text. For a more detailed discussion of how courts use equitable subordination against
arms-length creditors, see Andrew D. Natale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equi-
table Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAw. 417 (1985).
66 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
67 See id. § 365(a), (b).
68 See id. § 365(f).
69 To the text's list of reallocative bankruptcy features, Jackson and Scott would
add the bankruptcy trustee's extensive collection powers. They point out, for example,
that 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988) allows the trustee, on behalf of the general creditors, to
appropriate an unperfected security interest even if no other creditor has a lien on thb
secured creditor's collateral. Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 179. They view this as a
reallocation of contractual priority from the unperfected secured creditor to the general
creditors. This analysis, however, is in some respects inaccurate. As between the un-
perfected secured creditor-who is unperfected because it did not serve public notice of
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RISK-SHARING THEORY
The basic creditors' bargain heuristic rests on the conclusion
that investors, if able, would bargain collectively for bankruptcy's
presumably efficient provisions. 70 No part of the basic heuristic,
however, explains why creditors would bargain for bankruptcy pro-
visions that alter pre-existing, nonbankruptcy contractual priorities.
Indeed, the contracts, the only observable indication of creditor in-
tent, suggest that creditors would not have bargained for bank-
ruptcy's reallocative provisions. Creditors, for example, do not
agree to grant prebankruptcy equity investors a stake in an insolvent
debtor. Instead, creditors contract explicitly for a noncontingent
right to payment.71 Similarly, secured creditors do not agree to for-
feit their foreclosure rights without compensation. Rather, secured
creditors explicitly contract for those rights. 72 There is a logical gap
in a theory that presumes creditors would agree to an arrangement
that they seem explicitly to have rejected.
its security interest-and the general creditors, there is no contractual relationship.
Moreover, state law, not merely bankruptcy law, regulates the contract between the
debtor and the secured creditor. State law informs the secured creditor that unless it
files public notice, its security interest will be subordinate to the bankruptcy trustee's
interest. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1), (3) (1989). Jackson and Scott recognize the U.C.C.'s
special empowerment of the bankruptcy trustee, but treat the power as a creature of
bankruptcy law nevertheless. Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 179. This misassignment
of source is significant, given the role of public notice in a priority credit system. Public
notice enables a debtor to treat its contractual priority arrangements, in effect, as mutual
arrangements among creditors. Thus the rule that requires public notice allows efficient
priority contracts and in no sense abrogates or alters priorities. See generally Baird, supra
note 26, at 53 (describing mechanism of notice system).
Bankruptcy does interfere with nonbankruptcy law in another of the trustee's collec-
tion powers. Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988), and an old (and incomprehensible)
Supreme Court case, Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), the trustee may capture for credi-
tors the full amount of any fraudulent conveyance from the debtor to any party even if
nonbankruptcy fraudulent conveyance law would limit the amount of the fraudulent
transfer that the creditors could recover. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT
§ 9, 7A U.L.A. 577 (1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1985).
This extension of the trustee's reach places Jackson and Scott on firmer ground when
they argue that the trustee's collection powers operate to alter nonbankruptcy priorities.
SeeJackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 181. However, the recipient of a fraudulent convey-
ance is unlikely to have any contractual expectation that it will be able to keep any part of
a fraudulent transfer. Thus dishonoring the state law "entitlement" would do little to
interfere with contractual expectation. See also I 1 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1988) (similarly
allowing trustee to appropriate windfall from unrecorded mortgagee). And although a
more subtle extension of a bankruptcy trustee's powers permits appropriation of appre-
ciated property to an extent that exceeds any defrauded creditor's nonbankruptcy enti-
tlement, see I U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9, 7A
U.L.A. 427 (1985), this extension is sufficiently limited that it does not warrant signifi-
cant consideration.
70 See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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Recently, proponents of risk-sharing theory have published in
both law73 and finance 74 literature in an attempt to fill the breach.
These risk-sharing theorists contend that a distributional principle
underlies a richer version of the creditors' bargain, a principle that
requires "all participants [to] share (at least in part) the risks of busi-
ness failure."' 75 This hypothetical bargain redux has two fundamen-
tal parts: common-disaster insurance and eve-of-bankruptcy
conflict resolution. In theory, bankruptcy reallocation serves as in-
surance because it reduces junior claimants' preinsolvency risk and
resolves conflict by enhancing junior claimants' postinsolvency risk.
A. Common-Disaster Insurance
The first part of the risk-sharing hypothesis characterizes the
hypothetical creditors' bargain as one in which investors would mu-
tually benefit if they could share, rather than individually bear, the
risks of a debtor's failure. This follows from the observation that a
debtor's investors, equity and creditors, are risk averse.76 Risk-
averse investors, it follows, would garner some benefit if they could
share, rather than assign to a subgroup, the risk of loss from a de-
cline in a firm's affairs. This is especially true when an investor has a
large portion of her wealth, both pecuniary and human capital, in-
vested in the debtor. In such a case, the undiversified investor
would be extraordinarily sensitive to the debtor's plight. 77
73 See Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 160; Roe, supra note 4, at 222; Scott, supra
note 4, at 185. Cf. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 192 (risk-sharing theory can
"make one more comfortable" with breaches of contractual priority). Risk-sharing the-
ory is not a monolith. Ideas in the text that are described generally as part of risk-
sharing theory are attributed specifically in the related notes.
74 See Daigle & Maloney, supra note 5; Frierman & Viswanath, supra note 5.
75 Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 157.
76 A person is risk averse if she prefers a certain return on an investment to an
uncertain return with an expected value equal to the certain return. For further exam-
ples, see RIBSTEIN, supra note 34, at A-2. A canon of finance theory states that individu-
als are risk averse by nature. Cf. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAWv 75
(2d ed. 1977); CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS & POLI-
CIES 680-81 (10th ed. 1987). This is easy to accept. Consider a worker on whom her
family relies for its sustenance. Although there are exceptions, the worker is unlikely to
gamble her entire wealth on an investment that has an equal chance of doubling her
investment or dissipating it entirely. Moreover, any business association that includes
debt in its capital structure should also be risk averse because a fixed return avoids the
risk of insolvency, which entails real costs regardless of whether bankruptcy ensues. Cf.
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 8, at 421 (describing a firm's aversion to costs of financial
distress).
77 An investor whose wealth is diversified in independent investments does not
bear significant risk that his investment portfolio will fail: given independence in ex-
pected return among the investments, about as many unexpected individual successes as
unexpected individual failures are likely to occur. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 8,
149-66; cf. Franco Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return, 30
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 69 (1974).
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To illustrate, assume that an individual is a newspaper pub-
lisher's founder, manager, and sole owner. Suppose further that
this founder asks a potential creditor to make a loan to the pub-
lisher. The creditor might propose a loan at a favorable rate, but on
the condition that the founder inVest a large portion of her personal
wealth in the firm's equity. A creditor might impose this condition if
it believed the founder could not increase the risk of the debtor's
projects,78 because the founder cannot earn a return on her equity
investment unless the debtor earns enough to repay its creditors.
The larger her equity investment, the larger her incentive to enrich
equity and, necessarily, to satisfy the creditor's claim. But the
founder's large equity investments would also carry costs. If a major
portion of her wealth were tied up in the debtor's equity,
subordinate to and riskier than debt, the founder would be over-
whelmingly sensitive to the risk of the debtor's failure. 79 She might,
therefore, balk at the creditor's condition for the favorable loan.80
This conflict between incentive and risk-aversion is not insolu-
ble, however. The founder and the creditor may agree that the
creditor will sacrifice to the founder some portion of its priority
claim in exchange for a slightly higher interest rate on the loan. In
essence, the creditor's sacrifice is an insurance policy, and the inter-
est rate increase is an insurance premium. As a result of such insur-
ance, the higher interest rate would grant the creditor a somewhat
larger stake in any debtor success, and the dilution of the creditor's
priority claim would impose on the creditor a somewhat larger stake
in any debtor loss. The outcome of the deal for the founder is the
mirror image of the outcome for the creditor. The founder will ben-
efit less from success but suffer less from failure. This arrangement
will be mutually beneficial if the undiversified founder values the
78 See supra part I.B.
79 Jackson and Scott note that, in addition to an investment in equity and an invest-
ment in firm specific human capital, such an entrepreneur may possess "idiosyncratic"
value in the debtor and may for that reason be additionally sensitive to the risk of its
failure. Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 174. An illustration of idiosyncratic value is the
statement "it's my life's work" or "my name is on the door." Id. An entrepreneur's
idiosyncratic investment is not separate from an investment of her entire wealth. The
idiosyncratic investment is simply a nonpecuniary portion of her wealth. The point is
that entrepreneurs cannot diversify total commitment, whether that commitment is in
property or soul.
80 The conflict between incentive and risk aversion is at its peak when managers
own a firm's entire equity interest, as they often do after a management leveraged
buyout. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 8, at 816 ("When you concentrate a large
equity investment in a few hands, you lose the benefits of risk-sharing. Thus the manag-
ers in such buyouts have all their eggs in one corporate basket. On the other hand, they
are now working largely for themselves, which provides a wonderful incentive.").
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reduction in risk more than the presumably diversified creditor suf-
fers from assuming the additional risk.8 1
Risk-sharing theorists raise a problem with this simple descrip-
tion of a -risk-sharing arrangement and suggest that the description
obscures an important distinction between types of risks. 82 Accord-
ing to these theorists, the founder and the creditor described above
might decide to share the risk of loss from "exogenous" sources,
sources beyond management's control (e.g., a decline in the news-
paper industry) but probably would not find it mutually beneficial to
share the risk of failure from "endogenous" sources, sources within
management's control (e.g., managerial indolence, incompetence,
or preference for risk with the debtor's assets). 83 The creditor can-
not efficiently bear the burden of endogenous risk because the
founder, as manager, controls the debtor, and would be directly re-
sponsible for any management misbehavior. A creditor would be
unlikely to agree to share the loss from such behavior, at least not at
a price the founder would be willing to pay.
This point may be generalized. Equity, even if it is not coexten-
sive with management, because of its ability to control manage-
ment,84 is a lower cost avoider of endogenous risk than are
creditors. As a consequence of the distinction between endogenous
and exogenous risk, if the parties were to contractually shift risk
from a manager-equity investor to a creditor, they would shift only
exogenous risk. A basic tenet of risk-sharing theory is the difficulty
or impossibility of separating these risks by contract. There is, for
example, no objective way to distinguish precisely between incom-
petence and industry downturn as the source of failure. 85 So, if risk-
sharing theory holds, it is unlikely that a manager-equity investor
and a creditor will find it worth their efforts to negotiate a risk-shar-
ing contract. They will, instead, enter the standard equity and debt
contracts, which grant the creditor absolute priority over the equity
81 It is noteworthy that the text's illustration does not rest on an assumption of the
creditor's risk neutrality. The lone observation that the creditor likely holds a diversified
loan portfolio is sufficient to predict that the creditor will probably be more willing than
the founder to accept some risk of failure risk that otherwise would rest with the founder
as an undiversified equity investor. See supra note 77.
82 Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 163-64.
83 Jackson and Scott define endogenous risks as those that "arise from contingen-
cies whose probabilities or effects can be influenced by the actions of particular parties
or groups." Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 164.
84 See supra note 33-34 and accompanying text.
85 See Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 168 ("There are formidable operational diffi-
culties in distinguishing common risks from those that have been assigned to individual
claimants.").
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interest, even though both would benefit from a risk-sharing
arrangement.8 6
Risk-sharing theory offers a similar explanation of a secured
creditor's relationship with the debtor's equity and unsecured credi-
tors. A secured creditor's collateral insulates it from the risk of a
debtor's failure. That insulation, the theory predicts, makes a se-
cured creditor the insurer of the debtor's other claimants. As in-
surer, the secured creditor would sacrifice a portion of its priority
claim if the debtor suffered losses and became insolvent for reasons
beyond management's control. Thus, the secured creditor would
charge the debtor a higher interest rate, with the increase an insur-
ance premium for its prospective sacrifice. The debtor's manage-
ment, on behalf of equity investors or the investors collectively,
would have the debtor pay the higher rate if the debtor's equity in-
vestors or unsecured creditors (e.g., trade creditors) were unable to
diversify their investments, and, therefore, were more sensitive than
the secured creditor to the debtor's plight.8 7 Risk-sharing theory
presumes that this arrangement is mutually beneficial because eq-
uity investors or unsecured creditors value the reduction in risk
more than the secured creditor suffers from risk assumption. 8
Risk-sharing theorists hypothesize that secured creditors and debt-
ors do not contract for these insurance arrangements, despite the
potential benefit, because of the difficult distinction between endog-
enous and exogenous risk. Indeed, the secured creditor may have
taken collateral precisely to obviate its need to monitor the debtor
against the endogenous risk of management misbehavior.89 Once
again, the risk-sharing theorists' problem emerges that the parties
find it difficult or impossible to separate risks in which they can ben-
eficially share from risks in which they cannot.
86 Id. at 166.
87 A trade creditor might be undiversified if, because of its size, for example, it has
only a few debtors. If any of these debtors defaults, the impact on the trade creditor
might be significant. A trade creditor might, in any case, lack diversification across in-
dustries if, for example, its product is useful in only one industry. As for the undiversi-
fled trade creditor's sensitivity to the debtor's plight, see infra notes 173-76 and
accompanying text, which explain the importance of the distinction between diversifica-
tion and risk neutrality.
88 Jackson and Scott state this presumption boldly: "Secured creditors would agree
that whenever insolvency is triggered by common risks (interrelated technological
events with unpredictable effects) they would share with unsecured creditors and equity
some of the asset pool otherwise reserved to them." Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at
167-68. As part III.B. explains, this presumption is not justified.
89 As discussed infra note 163, the true reason for secured finance, if any, is the
subject of much debate. The monitoring hypothesis, described in the text, is merely one
explanation. See Thomas H.Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priori-
ties Among Creditors, 88 YALE LJ. 1143 (1979).
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In an attempt to overcome transactional impediments to con-
tract, risk-sharing theory provides the hypothetical agreement
among investors. In theory, bankruptcy's reallocative provisions
fulfill senior and junior investors' unrealized desires to partially
share risk. Risk-sharing theorists conclude that bankruptcy reorgan-
ization's tendency to favor equity90 may be a proxy for the bargain
the parties would have struck had such a bargain been practical.
The same may be said for bankruptcy's denial of reimbursement to a
secured creditor for the costs of its foregone foreclosure opportu-
nity, and bankruptcy's permissive application of equitable subordi-
nation.9' As Jackson and Scott state: "[G]iven the costs of deciding
whether insolvency resulted from a risk that had been individually
allocated or from a risk that was to be shared equally, some partial
blurring of entitlements may be a crude but effective response to the
general problem."'92
B. Eve-of-Bankruptcy Conflict
Risk-sharing theory addresses another problem to which "some
partial blurring of entitlements may be a crude but effective re-
sponse." This problem is eve-of-bankruptcy conflict. Recall eq-
uity's, and often management's, incentive to take excessive risks
with the debtors' assets.93 This incentive always conflicts with that
of the creditors and is not tied to bankruptcy. Equity's and manage-
ment's incentive is acute for a debtor that is insolvent or is on the
verge of insolvency, because insolvency leaves residual claimants lit-
tle to lose if the debtor's risky investment fails. It follows, then, that
if bankruptcy strictly obeyed contractual priority, a firm's insolvency
together with an impending bankruptcy would heighten manage-
ment's incentive to take risks. Insolvency usually accompanies the
eve of bankruptcy, so the eve portends a settlement of the insolvent
debtor's accounts without any guarantee that management will re-
tain control of the debtor and without any payment to equity. 94
Risk-sharing theorists posit that bankruptcy's reallocative provisions
mitigate eve-of-bankruptcy incentives. 95 The purported reason is
quite simple. If equity shares in the debtor's assets despite insol-
vency, when management gambles with those assets, it gambles to
some extent with equity's investment and, consequently, often with
the managers' own investments. As a result, management is likely to
90 See supra part I.B.
91 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
92 Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 196.
93 See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
95 See Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 169-74; Daigle & Maloney, supra note 5;
Frierman & Viswanath, supra note 5.
19921 461
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
be more prudent.96 The argument concludes that bankruptcy real-
location helps persuade management to leave creditors a slightly
smaller share of a substantially more valuable debtor.97
In addition to the conflict between incentives to assume risk, a
similar conflict exists between equity and creditors with respect to
management's diligence incentive. Without bankruptcy realloca-
tion, managers of a hopelessly insolvent debtor may have only a
worthless equity investment to lose should they be indolent or con-
sume perquisites.98 Reallocation partially restores the managers'
96 The benefits of risk-sharing might also provide a reason for leaving management
in control of the debtor throughout the bankruptcy process. See supra note 42 and ac-
companying text. But, as part III explains, bankruptcy is not a solution to any problem
of risk sensitivity, even if risk-sharing is a solution.
97 Actually,Jackson and Scott focus their version of risk-sharing theory not on man-
agement's or equity's likely eve-of-bankruptcy imprudence, but on that of secured credi-
tors. They discuss, for example, the phenomenon of "lien feeding." A secured creditor
"feeds" its lien when it convinces management to convert assets that are not subject to
the creditor's security interest into assets that are so subject. This improves the relative
position of the secured creditor at the expense of other claimants and at the expense of
the debtor as a whole if the conversion detracts from the debtor's business. One can
imagine, for example, an inventory financier who coerces the conversion of needed of-
fice equipment into excess inventory. Claimants collectively would seek to avoid such
behavior:
[r]o the extent that the creditors in the ex ante bargain determine to
collectivize in order to solve a central problem of noncooperation, they
would necessarily agree to a contribution arrangement in order to re-
strain eve of bankruptcy conflicts. In the absence of bankruptcy contribu-
tion, the parties would anticipate inefficient [business maneuvers such as
"lien feeding"] by secured creditors' exercising de facto control over the
debtor's business decisionmaking. Because such inefficiencies reduce to-
tal creditor wealth, contribution would be a predictable prophylactic to
any collectivization process.
Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 174.
This argument proves too much, however. First, bankruptcy preference rules exist
to combat lien feeding. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(c)(5), 550(a) (1988). Preference rules void
and reverse certain preferential transfers, and do so without reallocative effect other
than the reallocation inherent in the collective proceeding that is necessary to prevent
destructive "grabs." See supra part I.A. Second, to the extent lien feeding and similar
destructive behavior exists despite preference rules, risk-sharing exacerbates the problem.
If bankruptcy reduces the effectiveness of strategic behavior such as lien feeding, more
such behavior is necessary to accomplish repayment in full. To achieve a truly secure
position, for example, a secured creditor in inventory might have to convert all of the
debtor's office equipment to inventory. Therefore, unlike the positive effect of bank-
ruptcy reallocation on management's eve-of-bankruptcy incentive, which effect is real
but overcome by its costs, see infra part III, bankruptcy reallocation may have no positive
effect on secured creditors' incentives to control the firm efficiently. Risk-sharing theo-
rists could propose to eliminate a secured creditor's priority status. Enactment of such a
proposal would eliminate bankruptcy reallocation's tendency to heighten the secured
creditor's incentive to behave strategically because there would be no lien to feed. This
"solution," however, would carry its own costs. See infra notes 101-48 and accompany-
ing text. Risk-sharing theory does not go so far.
98 See Baird & Picker, supra note 52.
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stake, which, in theory, the managers will act to protect with compe-
tent management that benefits all.
As for the investors' inability to contract for a beneficial incen-
tive structure, risk-sharing theorists supplement the endogenous
risk explanation. A reason managers do not simply purchase and
hold the debtor's debt obligations, and thus reduce their exposure
to the debtor's insolvency, is that management and equity covet the
perverse incentives to risk other people's money. As a result, even if
the managers initially purchased debt, they would later sell it, re-
place it with more equity and, consequently, reinstate the perverse
investment incentives. 99 Thus, the theory predicts that even manag-
ers who wish to bond themselves against misbehavior cannot do so
through the purchase of debt, because other investors understand
the managers' incentive to trade the debt for equity. Bankruptcy
reallocation, which is not contract-bound, prevents such strategic
maneuvers, theoretically to the advantage of all investors.
III
A CRrrIQUE OF RISK-SHARING THEORY
Risk-sharing theorists argue that bankruptcy's reallocative pro-
visions may truly reflect an efficient bargain among investors, a bar-
gain investors would reach but for difficulties of negotiation. If this
is correct, then risk-sharing theory may justify bankruptcy's realloca-
tion of contractual priorities. Whether bankruptcy reallocation is
justified, in turn, depends on whether "the costs of implementation
... outweigh the benefits in enhancing the creditors' wealth."100
The benefits of bankruptcy reallocation, however, cannot out-
weigh its costs, risk-sharing arguments to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. The reasons fall into two classes. First, the costs of
bankruptcy's reallocative provisions are potentially far greater than
traditionally understood. Second, the benefits from those provi-
sions are illusory, both because the class of beneficiaries is small,
99 Frierman and Viswanath make this point by reference to managers' ability to
"undo" the issuance of convertible debt, which requires equity to share the upside of
any risky project. Frierman & Viswanath, supra note 5, at 2.. Their reference to converti-
ble debt, however, is inapposite. Although convertible debt reduces equity's zeal for
risk in a solvent firm, if equity is in control of an insolvent debtor, as the Frierman and
Viswanath risk-sharing model assumes, convertible debt does little to dampen manage-
ment's desire for risk. Management prefers any share of a favorable outcome to the zero
return it will receive if it does nothing. The text, infra, offers a more straightforward
solution to the managers' zeal, or "moral hazard." The Frierman-Viswanath presump-
tion of contractual ineffectiveness, however, would not change. As they state: "[W]hen
investors issue securities on their own account, they are able to 'undo' the effect of any
changes in the firm's capital structure." Id. at 14.
100 Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 157.
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and because alternatives provide any risk-sharing benefit at lower
cost.
A. Bankruptcy Reallocation Costs
In the analysis of bankruptcy reallocation's costs one must dis-
tinguish real costs from those that are merely apparent. Realloca-
tion is properly viewed from a baseline of investors' preferences as
revealed in their contracts. That baseline does not coincide with in-
vestors' expectations of performance pursuant to those contracts.
Investors bargain with full knowledge of bankruptcy's reallocative
provisions. As a result, those provisions do not produce a wealth
transfer. Instead, a senior claim will bear a higher rate of interest in
light of bankruptcy reallocation than it would in a world that fully
honored contractual priority. Conversely, a junior claim will bear a
lower rate of return. 10 1 These observations do not negate bank-
ruptcy reallocation's costs to investors. Rather, the central theme of
the discussion that follows is that these costs are large and indefen-
sible. The criticism of reallocation, however, is one of costs due to
inefficiency, not of inappropriate transfer. Those latter "costs" are
merely apparent.
Further distinctions exist among bankruptcy reallocation's real
costs. Bankruptcy reallocation from reorganization is distinct from
bankruptcy reallocation from denial of senior status. The costs that
these provisions impose are, for the most part, also distinct,
although one may characterize the costs from forum shopping and
perverse investor incentives as costs of more than one component of
bankruptcy's reallocation scheme. Some of these costs are alterna-
tives from which investors in a firm can choose at the time they
structure their investments. One or more of the costs, however, are
inevitable for a firm that issues debt, because the presence of debt
makes insolvency possible and the risk of bankruptcy inevitable. 10 2
1. Reorganization Costs
Reorganizations are expensive because claimants suffer from a
lack of perfect information and from incentives for strategic behav-
ior.10 3 A reorganized debtor would emerge quickly and cheaply
from bankruptcy if every creditor and equity claimant knew the true
101 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 1, at 180.
102 It is generally assumed that a debtor's management ordinarily cannot en-
forceably commit itself to refrain from bankruptcy. See, e.g., United States v. Royal Busi-
ness Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (dictum).
103 For more discussion of how uncertainty in the outcome of legal rules affects
costs, see ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION & WELFARE 55-86
(1986); David C. Webb, The Importance of Incomplete Information in Explaining the Existence of
Costly Bankruptcy, 54 EcONOMICA 279 (1987).
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value of the debtor's assets, the true amount of its own claim, the
relative priority of its own claim, and accepted that relative priority.
In practice, however, claimants often battle over these factors,1°4
and have incentives to bargain strategically even if they clearly un-
derstand their legal entitlements.1 05 These reorganization battles
and bargains impose both direct and indirect costs on a debtor.
And while not all these costs are properly attributable to bankruptcy
reallocation, most probably are.
a. Direct and Indirect Costs
Estimates of reorganization's direct costs, in the form of legal
fees and administrative expenses, 0 6 range from 3y to 25% of a
debtor's value.10 7 These costs are necessary to reorder the complex
network of contracts that comprises a firm. Estimates of direct
costs, however, do not represent total costs. In addition to direct
costs, reorganization costs include opportunity and uncertainty
costs. The opportunity costs stem from the distraction of manage-
ment. With its energies devoted to reorganization, management
may have few resources to expend on the debtor's business opera-
tions. The uncertainty costs emerge from the doubts reorganization
raises about the firm's ultimate survival. Reorganization often cre-
ates uncertainty about whether or to what extent the debtor will
continue as a going concern. This uncertainty may cause employees
and trade partners to curtail investments in activities that are worth-
while only if the debtor survives in its pre-reorganization form.
Thus, opportunity and uncertainty costs both flow from reorganiza-
tion's "disruption" of the debtor's affairs.' 0 8
104 See, e.g., Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1982) (dispute over
bankruptcy court's estimate of a contingent claim); In re Copy Crafters Quicksprint, Inc.,
92 B.R. 973 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing difficulties in asset valuation and prior-
ity determination).
105 See Bergman & Callen, supra note 45. See generally supra part I.B.
106 See I 1 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1988) (allowing payment of administrative expenses).
107 See, e.g., DAVID. T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GmTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM 263 (1971) (about 25%); Warner, supra note 1, at 271 (about 5%) (legal costs);
Weiss, supra note 1, at 285 (about 3%, under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). It
appears that firm size is inversely related to the proportion of firm value lost. See id. The
studies in STANLEY & GIRTH and Warner, supra, observe bankruptcies prior to the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, but the process of court-supervised negotiation among
claimants was fundamentally the same. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 31-37 (2d ed. 1990).
108 In a recent paper, Mnookin and Wilson summarize reorganization costs:
When liabilities exceed assets and a reorganization is necessary, a
vast number of contractual relationships must be changed. The scope of
this task is enormous; indeed, the entire firm can be viewed as nothing
more than a cluster of implicit and explicit contracts, each of which may
be affected. The interests of different claimants often conflict, and within
each class of claimants there are often multiple parties. A reorganization
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Disruption costs can be more than important; they can be enor-
mous. For example, in the Texaco-Pennzoil dispute, Pennzoil won a
multibillion dollar judgment against Texaco, 10 9 which entered bank-
ruptcy reorganization to seek protection from its judgment credi-
tor.110 Soon after, the parties settled the claim and terminated the
bankruptcy action."' Almost immediately after the settlement an-
nouncements, the combined value of Texaco and Pennzoil stock
rose $2.3 billion.'" 2 The market price of a firm's publicly traded
securities provides an unbiased estimate of the firm's value." 13 One
can estimate, therefore, that the news of settlement coincided with a
$2.3 billion increase in the combined values of Pennzoil and Tex-
aco. Any unanticipated wealth transfer to Pennzoil from the settle-
ment, though, ought to have been exactly offset by an unanticipated
wealth transfer from Texaco, and vice versa. The explanation for
the combined gain must be nondistributional. A sound explanation
is that the settlement avoided what investors anticipated would be a
protracted and costly bankruptcy reorganization process, one with
an expected cost of an additional $2.3 billion." 14 That amount is
well in excess of any potential administrative fees or expenses,"15
and is, therefore, most easily attributed to bankruptcy's disruption
of the firm's business activities and opportunities. 16
An earlier event study by Jerold Warner of the values of rail-
road company securities during corporate reorganizations also sup-
(whether accomplished in a bankruptcy proceeding or as a "workout"
outside of bankruptcy) involves a very complicated bargaining game in
which many claimants try to maximize their own self-interest. The fear
that a firm is or may soon become insolvent causes various claimants of
the firm to engage in behavior that is not joint wealth maximizing. The
inability of all involved to work together collectively often leads to pro-
tracted negotiations that have enormous transaction costs in terms of
professional fees. Even more importantly, during this period, the current
operations of a company can be severely hampered. Relations with cus-
tomers, suppliers, and bankers can all be disrupted. Attention may be
diverted and the quality of service may decline. Key employees may
leave, and a vast amount of firm-specific capital may be lost because of
uncertainty about the structure or needs of the reorganized firm.
Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Under-
standing Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295, 313 (1989) (emphasis added).
109 David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Finan-
cial Distress: Evidence from Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. EcoN. 157, 157 (1988).
110 Id. at 159.
''1 Id.
112 See id. at 160.
113 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 8, at 279-300.
114 Cutler & Summers, supra note 109, at 166-69.
115 Id.
116 See Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 108, at 299. These disruption costs may have
included the potential loss of a profitable bid to purchase Texaco. See Cutler & Sum-
mers, supra note 109, at 168.
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ports the possibility of considerably large disruption costs. 1 17 In
order to monitor security price changes, the study used three
Supreme Court decisions that validated portions of reorganization
plans. These decisions presumably avoided extensive renegotiation
among claimants and thereby eliminated the associated delay."l 8
The announcements of the decisions corresponded with significant
increases in the bond prices of the bankrupt railroads. Warner was
tempted to conclude that the decisions:
may have conveyed new information that the length of the rail-
road bankruptcies would be shorter than the market had antici-
pated. To the extent that the bankruptcy process was costly to the
railroad firms, such information would have lowered the market's
assessment of the expected cost of bankruptcy, and resulted in an
increase in the value of the firm's securities. 19
Warner had reservations, however, and noted that bankruptcy costs.
are too small to explain the abnormal increase in bond prices.' 20
But this misgiving apparently was based on consideration of only
direct bankruptcy costs.' 2 ' Warner might well have come to a differ-
ent conclusion had he considered that prolonged railroad bankrupt-
des impose additional disruption costs on the debtors. Warner's
data, therefore, could support a conclusion that bankruptcy reor-
ganization engenders disruption costs that far exceed the tradition-
ally estimated direct costs of reorganization.
b. Attribution to Bankruptcy Reallocation
Not all costs of reorganization are necessarily attributable to
bankruptcy reallocation. One could speculate that costs from reor-
ganization are necessary to preserve an insolvent debtor's going-
concern surplus over its piecemeal liquidation value. If this were so,
it would be improper to attribute bankruptcy reorganization costs to
bankruptcy's reallocation function, and to consider those costs as an
offset to any risk-sharing benefit. Moreover, without bankruptcy,
negotiation and holdout problems could impose even greater costs
on a debtor than does negotiation within bankruptcy, which pre-
vents destructive individual creditor action.1 22 Theoretically, how-
ever there is an alternative version of bankruptcy that would limit
117 Warner, supra note 1.
118 Id. at 268 nn.21 & 22. The cases analyzed are Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318
U.S. 448, reh'g denied, 318 U.S. 803 (1943); Group of Inst. Investors v. Chicago, Milwau-
kee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, reh'g denied, 318 U.S. 803 (1943); Consolidated
Rock Prod. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
119 Warner, supra note 1, at 271.
120 Id.
121 Id. See also Webb, supra note 103 (discussing this and other cost studies).
122 See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. But cf. note 19.
1992] 467
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
reorganization's costs, and sacrifice only bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion's reallocative tendency. The difference in cost between current
bankruptcy law and the alternative is properly attributable to bank-
ruptcy reallocation and does offset any risk-sharing benefit.
This alternative and less costly version of bankruptcy can be
found in a Douglas Baird proposal.' 23 He asks why we should not
simply do away with bankruptcy reorganization. If claimants to an
insolvent debtor could not settle their claims through a consensual
arrangement, then bankruptcy could intervene, but only as neces-
sary to sell the firm at a public auction, free from all prebankruptcy
claims. The bankruptcy court would sell the debtor either piece-
meal or as a going concern, in the way that would bring the highest
price, with current management at the helm should purchasers so
desire. The court would then divide the sale proceeds among claim-
ants strictly in accord with their legal priorities, priorities whose
source would be entirely outside bankruptcy law. The simplicity of
this proposal makes it the system of insolvency resolution that most
directly arises from the basic creditors' bargain heuristic.' 24 'Not co-
incidentally, the proposal would eliminate one set of bankruptcy's
most onerous costs: the costs of a protracted reorganization pro-
cess. Baird's proposal would eliminate such costs, because the sale
of the firm would eliminate management's and equity's ability to
hold the debtor hostage under threat of reduction in debtor value
during "ransom" negotiations. ,25 While some direct and disruption
costs are inherent in reorganization, 26 the protraction that com-
pounds those costs is not, and a compulsory bankruptcy auction
would eliminate strategic protraction.' 27 Baird's proposal would re-
quire the expense of an auction, but investment bankers have be-
come quite proficient in the auction of even huge firms.' 28
123 See Baird, supra note 25; Meckling, supra note 45, at 38. See also In re Central Ice
Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that bankruptcy court "auction"
debtor's claims against third parties).
124 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
125 Part I.B. describes how management or equity can take advantage of such
negotiations.
126 See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
127 Baird provides an illustration of the costs his proposal would eliminate:
If the shareholders have the right to insist on a valuation that would con-
sume $ 10,000 of the firm's assets, it is in the interests of the [creditors] as
a group to offer the shareholders something less than $10,000 to waive
this right. But bargaining over the waiver of procedural rights is itself
costly and brings with it holdout and free-rider problems.
Baird, supra note 25, at 144. For a formal model of these strategic difficulties, see Berg-
man & Callen, supra note 45.
128 A large common stock offering, over $100 million, may cost an average of 4%o of
total proceeds in underwriters' compensation and other expenses. This proportion may
increase to as much as 15% in the case of extremely small offerings (less than $2 mil-
lion). See Clifford W. Smith, Alternative Methods for Raising Capital Rights versus Underwrit-
[Vol. 77:439468
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All that is lost in Baird's proposal is bankruptcy's reallocation
function. The proposal sacrifices that function because it fully hon-
ors nonbankruptcy priorities. Strategic behavior, moreover, would
not easily upset these contractual priorities, because junior claim-
ants would lose the control of the debtor, control they use as lever-
age over senior claimants. The proposal sacrifices no more than
reallocation, because bankruptcy can abandon its reallocative func-
tion without abandoning its primary function of preserving going-
concern value. The auction preserves going-concern value because
bids for the debtor will reflect that value.1 29 If risk-sharing theory is
to defend bankruptcy reallocation, it must at a minimum justify that
portion of bankruptcy reorganization costs that exceed the expense
of a simple auction.' 3 0 Although excess expense may not always at-
tach to bankruptcy reorganization,13 1 given the potentially enor-
mous disruption costs of a reorganization protracted by the
ten Offerings, 5J. FIN. ECON. 273 (1977). These costs are within the range of bankruptcy's
direct costs. See supra note 107. But a quick sale of a bankrupt debtor can save the enor-
mous disruption expense 'of a purposefully prolonged bankruptcy reorganization
process.
129 See supra part I.A. Baird conceives of a' potential benefit from reorganization
other than preservation of going-concern value. He credits the possibility that a closely
held debtor with multiple claimants may benefit from reorganization if the skill of those
claimants is essential to the debtor's survival. Baird, supra note 25, at 142. An accounts
receivable financier, for example, may be better equipped to continue in that role than
some third-party 'mancier. Even if claimants with special expertise could not coordinate
a bid for the debor, they should be able to sell their expertise to a third-party purchaser.
The accounts receivable financier, for example, could offer the debtor a cheaper rate for
financial services than could its competitors. Thus Baird may understate his own case.
But for an additional concern about auctions, see Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using
Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27 (1991).
130 One could speculate that much of any excess cost is not attributable to bank-
ruptcy, because creditors could bargain for the right to control the debtor in bank-
ruptcy. With such control, creditors could avoid management's coercive influence.
Such speculation is fruitless, however. If creditors do not in fact bargain for the right to
replace management in bankruptcy, it may be because creditors expect a change in con-
trol to be destructive at such a critical time. Thus the prospect of bankruptcy realloca-
tion places creditors on the horns of a dilemma that management or equity can exploit
to its benefit and to the collective detriment of the claimants.
131 Judge Easterbrook argues that auctions may often be more expensive than reor-
ganization. See Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 415. Judge Easterbrook, however, relies
largely on evidence that parties seldom resort to auctions in private workouts. This
observation may demonstrate that the costs of an auction exceed the costs of a reorgani-
zation, given unanimous agreement among claimants on how to distribute the debtor's
property. But the observation says little about relative costs absent such unanimous
agreement, because dissent may prompt management, acting on equity's behalf, orjun-
ior creditors to impose bankruptcy reorganization and its bias in favor of the junior
claimants directly. See supra part I.B. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303 (1988) (criteria for
debtor and creditor bankruptcy petitions); infra note 139 (mechanics of and interests in
bankruptcy petitions). Management, moreover, ordinarily cannot bond itself in advance
to forswear bankruptcy reorganization, even if that is the more expensive method of
insolvency resolution. See, e.g., United States v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 724 F.2d
12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (dictum).
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bankruptcy process, 3 2 bankruptcy reallocation's burden is
considerable.13 3
This burden is not significantly smaller if creditors steadfastly
attempt to thwart a strategy of delay by refusing concessions to
management or equity. Creditor refusal to concede could induce a
management or equity attempt to force through, or "cram-down,"
its plan sooner rather than later. In the alternative, creditors could
refuse to concede and attempt to cram down their own plan over the
objection of management or equity. 3 4 In the cram-down process,
however, the debtor's true worth remains uncertain due to the im-
precise valuation process. 35 And although the courts can end im-
broglios over valuation through decision, their mandate to provide a
fair hearing leaves them little practical opportunity to expedite mat-
ters.' 36 Thus, with or without a cram-down, the stage is set for the
indecision, delay, and loss that the claimants collectively could avoid
were bankruptcy simply to auction the debtor and thus free it from
management and equity. exploitation.
The costs of protracted negotiation and litigation are not the
only ones attributable to bankruptcy reallocation. Bankruptcy reor-
ganization's reallocative tendencies also may perversely induce
management or equity to impose on the claimants collectively the
additional costs inherent in bankruptcy reorganization. This can oc-
132 See supra part III.A.l.a.
133 In their formulation of risk-sharing theory, Jackson and Scott recognize the cost
from strategic behavior. They note that the uncertainty of the reallocative process will
lead "each claimant in bankruptcy [to] engage in costly efforts to minimize its individual
contribution to the bankruptcy sharing." Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 201. But they
do not elaborate, thus ignoring the potential magnitude of that cost, which is easily
underestimated.
134 Part I.B. describes cram-down over creditors' objections. Nothing in the Bank-
ruptcy Code prevents the creditors' use of the cram-down process after the expiration of
management's exclusive period to propose a reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1121, 1129(b) (1988).
135 Id. See also notes 11-19 and accompanying text (illustrating the costs Baird's pro-
posal would eliminate). Bebchuk proposes an alternative to the bankruptcy court's valu-
ation of a debtor. He would have the bankruptcy process grant options to claimants,
such that each junior class of claimants would collectively possess the option to purchase
the debtor for a price equal to the total amount of all senior claims. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REv. 775 (1988). This
approach would solve the debtor-valuation problem and would shorten the reorganiza-
tion process. But the auction Baird proposes solves the valuation problem and shortens
and simplifies the reorganization process. Bebchuk's approach offers no affirmative ad-
vantage of bankruptcy reorganization, and does not, therefore, serve as a defense of
bankruptcy reorganization.
136 For example, the average length of the bankruptcy process for a sample of 37
New York and American Stock Exchange firms that filed for bankruptcy under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is 2.5 years. Weiss, supra note 1. Smaller debtors, those with
about $50 million in revenues, experience similar delays; their bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions take an average of 1.6 years. Karen Torrey, Ch. 11 Alternative Often a Better Bet for
Small Biz, CRAxN'S CHI. Bus., August 29, 1988, at 12.
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cur even when the efficient alternative is piecemeal liquidation of
the debtor, thus avoiding all reorganization costs. This perverse in-
centive is apparent from the perspective of a junior claimant who
would receive nothing in a piecemeal liquidation, but who, through
negotiation or litigation, could obtain a share of any going concern
that survived bankruptcy. From that claimant's perspective, a share
of an inefficiently reorganized firm with poor chances of ultimate
survival is superior to an efficient piecemeal liquidation.137 In fact,
many reorganized firms fail shortly after reorganization.1 3 8 Bank-
ruptcy reallocation may thus be responsible even for reorganization
costs that are inherent to both bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy reor-
ganization, because bankruptcy reallocation may often be responsi-
ble for the reorganization itself' 3 9
2. Forum Shopping Costs
Forum shopping imposes costs on any dispute resolution sys-
tem that provides different entitlements within the system than
those provided outside the system.' 40 Accordingly, if a manager-
equity investor has an advantage inside bankruptcy and creditors
have an advantage outside, the manager could waste the debtor's
resources in an attempt to use the bankruptcy process, even if a
nonbankruptcy resolution would be less costly.' 4 ' This is also true
of incentives for strategic behavior in a conflict between general and
secured credi-ors, with the former as bankruptcy's proponents and
the latter its opponents.
137 See Michelle White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. EcoN. PERSP. 129
(Spring 1989); Michelle White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority
Rules, I 1 BELLJ. ECON. 550 (1980); but see David T. Brown, Claimholder Incentive Conflicts in
Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy Law, 2 REv. FIN. STUD. 109 (1989). Brown argues
that the bankruptcy process facilitates the negotiation of an efficient insolvency resolu-
tion. Brown, however, assumes that a bankruptcy court provides an "unbiased esti-
mate" of firm value. Id. at 113. The evidence weighs against the proposition that courts
either provide such an unbiased estimate or try. See supra note 56.
138 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 100 (1983).
139 The focus here is on strategic behavior of management and equity. Little is said
of general unsecured creditors as junior claimants with their own strategic agenda. In
theory, strategic manipulation is not the sole province of management or equity. The
denial of pendency reimbursement to a secured creditor, for example, could induce un-
secured creditors to extend the reorganization process and thus lengthen the time they
can benefit from the uncompensated use of the secured creditor's collateral. See supra
part I.B. However, unlike equity, which has little to lose from the waste of an insolvent
firm, unsecured creditors, as the residual claimants of such a firm, bear reorganization's
substantial costs. Thus general creditor strategy that protracts reorganization seems rel-
atively unlikely.
140 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 9, at 825.
141 Baird provides the example of a litigant who takes a costly trip to a distant court-
house, one with more favorable rules for that litigant than those of the courthouse next
door. Id.
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In theory, bankruptcy need not entail forum shopping costs. If
bankruptcy did not offer special entitlements to any claimant then
no creditor would employ the costly bankruptcy forum unless that
forum provided benefits to the claimants collectively.' 42 Bank-
ruptcy's reallocative provisions, however, necessarily rely on bank-
ruptcy entitlements that differ from nonbankruptcy entitlements.
So one might well attribute the cost of forum shopping to bank-
ruptcy reallocation.
In the alternative, one could consider the cost of forum shop-
ping as a subcategory of delay and uncertainty costs, of which reor-
ganization is a principal cause.' 43 Virtually any claimant, whether
equity investor or creditor, who can take advantage of bankruptcy,
has the option directly or through similarly situated claimants, to
impose bankruptcy.144 This option to impose bankruptcy makes
nonbankruptcy entitlements meaningless. All claimants realize that
the bankruptcy rules control, and all claimants bargain in the
shadow of those rules, t45 both before and after the debtor's insol-
vency. 146 Because the bankruptcy forum will favor someone, if the
142 The ordinary solution to a common-pool problem is an exclusive solution be-
cause it is advantageous to have a single set of rules. Claimants to an oil well, for exam-
ple, must at all times divide the oil in the well according to the common agreement. The
common agreement always comprises the rule of the game, not only when others object
to some individual claimant's rights under a different regime. See JACKSON, Supra note
11, at I 1 n. 11 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
144 Technically, a rare claimant has a unilateral right to force a debtor into bank-
ruptcy. First, no individual equity shareholder can petition for bankruptcy. If equity is
to petition, it must be through the "debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1988). Thus, for an
equity investor to force bankruptcy, management must act as equity's agent. See supra
note 43. Second, a creditors' petition ordinarily is not effective unless at least three
creditors file the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988). Third, a creditors' petition will
not be effective unless the petitioners are undersecured (are owed more than the value
of their collateral) by at least $5000, and either the debtor is not generally paying on its
obligations or a nonbankruptcy custodian recently has been appointed to administer the
debtor's assets. Id. None of these potential restrictions, however, is a long-term impedi-
ment to any claimant who might desire bankruptcy. An equity investor who desires
bankruptcy is likely to share that desire with management. See part I.B. A creditor who
desires bankruptcy is likely to find many other creditors with as much to lose from delay
and with the same desire.
145 For a general discussion of bargains made in the shadow of the law, see Robert
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
146 Universal access to bankruptcy is no accident. Congress was quite adamant that
every creditor have access to the bankruptcy process: "[Oince a proceeding to liquidate
assets has been commenced, the debtor's creditors have an absolute right to have the
liquidation (or reorganization) proceed in the bankruptcy court and under the bank-
ruptcy laws with all of the appropriate creditor and debtor protection those laws pro-
vide." HousE JUDICIARY COMM'N, THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1978). Congress's intent to grant management the
right to bring the debtor into bankruptcy, on either equity's behalf or its own, is evident
from management's plenary right to bankruptcy. See I 1 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
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claimants cannot settle their disputes consensually, the favored
claimants will opt for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy forum will be
the forum of resolution.' 47
Thus, when the bankruptcy process imposes costs from strate-
gic behavior, those costs arise from inherent uncertainties, 48 rather
than from the parties "shopping" for the forum that best suits them.
Therefore, however one characterizes the costs of bankruptcy and
the protracted negotiation and litigation it encourages, the costs are
real and borne by the claimants collectively.
3. Perverse Investment Incentives
Bankruptcy's reallocative provisions create two types of per-
verse incentives for managers whose interests are aligned with those
of equity: perverse risk incentives and perverse diligence incentives.
a. Risk Ihicentives
As risk-sharing theorists contend, bankruptcy's reallocative pro-
visions probably reduce management's incentive to take undue risks
with the debtor's assets, on equity's behalf, when the debtor is insol-
vent, on or after the eve of bankruptcy. 49 But the effect these pro-
visions have on incentives is not limited to the period immediately
before bankruptcy. The provisions also provide incentives to man-
agement and equity in periods of debtor solvency. And in certain
instances of debtor solvency, bankruptcy reallocation increases man-
agement's incentive to take undue risks with the debtor's assets on
equity's behalf.
Recall that bankruptcy reallocation reduces management's eq-
uity incentive to risk the debtor's assets when the debtor is insolvent
or barely solvent, because reallocation gives equity a stake in even
an insolvent debtor, a stake management can lose with a foolish in-
vestment. 150 If the debtor is substantially solvent, however, the
prospect of reallocation only exacerbates management's equity incen-
tive to invest the debtor's assets in a risky project. Bankruptcy real-
location provides equity with a stake in an insolvent debtor
regardless of insolvency's cause. In effect, bankruptcy reallocation
forces the creditors to compensate equity for any of its losses from
risky investment of the debtor's assets. This compensation both
subsidizes and encourages such investment. Thus, bankruptcy real-
location's effect on management's equity risk incentive serves to dis-
147 For a similar argument, see Warren, supra note 9, at 780-82.
148 See supra part III.A.I.
149 See Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 170; Daigle & Maloney, supra note 5;
Frierman & Viswanath, supra note 5; see supra Part II.
150 Id.
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courage risky investment only when the debtor is insolvent or nearly
insolvent at the time of a prospective investment. If the debtor is
solvent and management has an opportunity to invest the debtor's
equity cushion (assets that exceed debt obligations) but not a signifi-
cant portion of the debtor's assets beyond the equity cushion, then
reallocation creates a perverse incentive.
An example will clarify this point. Assume a debtor has $200 in
assets, $99 from an equity investment and $101 from creditors. As-
sume further that equity controls the debtor and has an option to
have the debtor purchase a $100 lottery ticket that offers a 50y
chance of a $190 return and a 50% chance of no return. From the
investors' collective perspective, the debtor should not purchase the
lottery ticket, which is worth only $95.151 Without bankruptcy real-
location, the debtor will not make this unwise investment. If the
ticket pays off, equity will benefit by $90: the debtor will have $290
worth of assets instead of $200. But if the ticket ultimately is worth-
less, an equally likely event, the debtor will be insolvent ($100 in
assets and $101 in debt) and equity will lose $99, its entire invest-
ment. Equity thus has no incentive to invest the debtor's assets in
the ticket.
The introduction of bankruptcy reallocation changes the
calculus and the debtor may well purchase the "sucker" ticket. Sup-
pose bankruptcy requires that equity receive 15% of a debtor's as-
sets, regardless of whether the debtor can fully repay creditors.
Now if the ticket pays off, equity will benefit by $90, just as without
reallocation. But if the ticket loses and the debtor enters bank-
ruptcy, equity will lose only $84: it will receive $15 of the debtor's
remaining $100 value. Absent other considerations, equity would
have the debtor purchase the ticket because the ticket's expected
value, from the standpoint of equity, is positive. That is, equity has
an equal chance of a $90 gain and an $84 loss. To equity, this is
better than a fair bet, and hence bankruptcy reallocation provides a
perverse incentive. 152
Bankruptcy's reallocation provisions will have a salutary effect
if, after the debtor purchases the ticket and it loses, equity has an
151 The calculation is: [.5 ($0) + .5 ($190] = $95.
152 This illustration is simplistic. It assumes, for example, that assets the debtor
does not use for the lottery ticket are risk-free. If the illustration corresponded with
reality, and allowed the unused assets to vary in value, one could construct a hypotheti-
cal in which bankruptcy reallocation discouraged the ticket purchase. However, a mirror
image of that observation is that variance in the value of an insolvent firm's assets allows
a hypothetical in which bankruptcy reallocation encourages the ticket purchase. Thus
simplification does not detract from the point in the text, which is that risk-sharing the-
ory ignores the mirrored nature of bankruptcy reallocation's effects. For more on in-
vestment incentives, see generally White, supra note 137.
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opportunity to control the firm for a period prior to bankruptcy.
For example at this point, equity would not have the debtor
purchase another $100 lottery ticket, one with only a 5% chance of a
$200 payoff. Equity might have the debtor spend $100 for this
ticket, worth $4.95153 to equity if equity had no interest in the insol-
vent debtor, but would not risk the $15 bankruptcy reallocation
guarantees it. This is hardly a benefit from reallocation, however,
because, in this example, the presence of bankruptcy reallocation in
the first instance creates the loss such reallocation later limits.
When viewed from the whole-life perspective of a debtor, then,
bankruptcy's reallocative provisions may provide risk incentive costs
that outweigh the risk incentive benefits of insolvency. Investors ini-
tially expect that a small equity cushion is a more likely future event
than none at all.. 5 4 Given that a business firm ordinarily commits
some portion of its assets to a use that management cannot alter,
management is more likely to risk a small equity cushion than all, or
almost all, of the debtor's assets. Thus reallocation's perverse risk
incentive may well eclipse any beneficial incentive.' 55
b. Diligence Incentives
The collective interests of the claimants, including creditors,
extend beyond creditors' interests in managers' risk incentives. All
nonmanager claimants also have an interest in management's incen-
tive to find -and manage the debtor's investments diligently. Debt
serves this interest because the imposition of fixed obligations disci-
plines management. If management does not produce sufficient in-
come to pay creditors, the debtor will become insolvent, equity will
lose its investment, and the managers may lose theirjobs.' 56 Recall
153 The calculation is: [.05 ($200-$101)] = $4.95.
154 Investors purchase interests in a firm with the expectation that the firm will re-
main solvent, despite the ever-present risk that it will not. Insolvency will have a
probability somewhere on the "tail" in a distribution of all possible outcomes. If that
distribution is normal, all outcomes between the most probable outcome and insolvency
are more likely than insolvency. See PHiLiPJ. MCCARTHY, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL
R.AsONING 233-44 (1978).
155 One could speculate that some managers will invest so much firm-specific human
capital in the debtor, or possess so large a fixed salary or other obligation, that the
managers' predominant interest will be to avoid bankruptcy, which, such managers rea-
sonably would fear, could cost theirjobs. See Kitch, supra note 36, at 684 (discussing the
interaction of law and human capital investment). In this case, little would persuade
management to risk the debtor's equity cushion, and bankruptcy reallocation's perverse
incentive would be small. If this is the case, however, bankruptcy reallocation's benefi-
cial incentive is also small, because managers would risk almost anything to return the
debtor to solvency and save their jobs.
156 See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, Corporate Financial Structure and
Managerial Incentives, in INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY (J.J. McCall ed., 1982); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 650, 655 n.24,
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from risk-sharing theory that, once insolvency mutes the discipline
of debt, bankruptcy reallocation provides management with a sub-
stitute disciplinary incentive. 157 Viewed at a time when the debtor is
solvent, however, bankruptcy reallocation softens the blow of insol-
vency to any manager who owns an equity interest in the debtor.
This reduced effect on the managers' equity investments lowers the
managers' expected costs of leisure and perquisites, and thus dulls
management's incentive to work diligently and invest the debtor's
assets wisely. In short, the less insolvency hurts, the less personal
expense and effort managers will devote to its avoidance. One must
add the costs of a solvent debtor's lethargic and irresponsible man-
agement to the total costs of bankruptcy's reallocative provisions.
4. Compulsory Contract Term Inefficiences
Viewed properly, from the time of equity or creditor invest-
ment, bankruptcy's reallocation of contractual priority constitutes
an imposition of compulsory contract terms. This imposition car-
ries two related costs: costs from inefficiencies in the expectation of
bankruptcy and costs from inefficiencies in the avoidance of
bankruptcy.
a. In Expectation of Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy reallocates broadly. Uncertain impulses favor jun-
ior claimants in negotiation and litigation.1 58 Direct provisions also
reallocate through the denial of senior status either to a secured
creditor who is denied pendency reimbursement, or to any creditor
whose failure to contribute to a troubled debtor will result in "equi-
table" subordination. 159 At least when direct reallocations are cer-
tain, as in the denial of pendency reimbursement, risk-sharing
theorists intimate that the costs of such reallocation may be small.160
This outcome, however, is not certain. There is a potentially large
cost: even direct reallocation interferes with the operation of invest-
ment markets. To understand this cost, consider the plight of se-
cured creditors who recognize that bankruptcy may not fully honor
their contractual priority over other claimants. Secured creditors
bargain in the shadow of the law' 61 and understand the prospect of
subordination relative to the explicit terms of their contracts. Se-
cured creditors therefore will account for the expected reduction in
658 (1984); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE LJ. 49 (1982).
157 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
159 See supra part I.B.
160 See Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 199.
161 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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priority status, and will charge the debtor for this reduction in the
form of higher interest rates. In essence, secured creditors become
more like unsecured creditors. They face higher risks and, there-
fore, demand that the debtor promise a larger return. To a corre-
sponding extent, the unsecured creditors become more like secured
creditors. They face lower risks and can demand only a smaller re-
turn. Ostensibly, these counterbalanced shifts in security and inter-
est rates have no effect. The debtor's blended interest rate appears
not to change, and each creditor, whether secured or unsecured,
receives the promise of return for which it bargains.' 62 In reality,
however, the prospect of a secured creditor's partial relegation to
unsecured status reduces the value of the security interest. The par-
ties must have perceived the security interest as valuable or, pre-
sumably, they would not have agreed to establish it in the first
instance.
Assume, for example, that a secured creditor bargains for se-
curity because it is an inherently poor monitor of a debtor's general
financial affairs. Assume further that an unsecured creditor remains
unsecured because it is a relatively good general monitor. If so, a
debtor's investors collectively benefit from the secured creditor's re-
liance on its collateral and the unsecured creditor's reliance on its
skills as a monitor.163 Even partial relegation of the secured credi-
tor to junior status reduces the mutually beneficial distinction be-
tween junior and senior claimants, because such relegation forces
the secured creditor to forego some of its security. As a result, the
secured creditor has a greater incentive to monitor, a task for which
by hypothesis it is ill-suited. It follows that the secured creditor's
relative incompetence will force it to charge the debtor more for its
monitoring than the unsecured creditor will grant the debtor as a
162 See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 24, at 261.
163 For a full discussion of this theory, seeJackson & Kronman, supra note 89. There
is much debate about whether monitoring or some other phenomenon explains secured
credit's value. There is, however, no contention that secured credit is valueless. (For
the purposes of the text's discussion, any value will do.) For an account of the debate on
secured credit, see, e.g., Barry E. Adler, An Equity Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy Priority
Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1993); Frank H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority
Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986); Thomas H.Jackson & Alan Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact
or Vacuous Theory:A Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 987 (1985); Homer Kripke,
Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985); Levmore, supra note 156; Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan
Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL SrUD. 209 (1989); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy
Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Alan Schwartz, The
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1984); Robert E. Scott, A Rela-
tional Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986); James J. White, Efficiency
Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984).
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rebate for its diminished monitoring role.'64 Consequently, inves-
tors collectively suffer from wasted monitoring resources and a
higher blended interest rate.
This inefficient incentive to monitor can be characterized as a
general cost of bankruptcy reallocation. Because of reallocation, no
creditor will rely fully on its priority position over equity. As a re-
sult, creditors may generally waste resources in an attempt to moni-
tor the debtor's activity to an extent that would have been
unnecessary had they been able to rely on contractual priority. 165
Put simply, bankruptcy reallocation coaxes creditors toward a posi-
tion of eternal vigilance because by the time the debtor is on the
brink of insolvency, the creditors may have already lost a significant
portion of their investment. This added need for vigilance is costly
not only to those creditors whose relatively weak skills as monitors
place them at a competitive disadvantage, but also to equity inves-
tors who must compensate the creditors for costs that the equity
investors would have otherwise avoided.
Bankruptcy reallocation can exact a particularly high price from
management equity investors, who may wish to have the firm issue
debt instead of additional equity in order to offer their equity invest-
ment as a bond against management misbehavior.'6 6 Bankruptcy
reallocation limits the effectiveness of such a bond and, conse-
quently, impairs the efficient allocation of risk and responsibility be-
tween equity and creditors.1 67
164 In their exposition of risk-sharing theory, Jackson and Scott specifically note this
potential inefficiency. Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 162 n. 13. Moreover, the ineffi-
ciency is analogous to that which Jackson and Scott call screening costs:
Parties who would be willing to pay the added cost to share common risks
presumably would prefer not to pay to share those risks that can be re-
duced by individual precautions. Screening failures force claimants to
pay for more bankruptcy sharing than they would have agreed to in the
original creditors' bargain.
Id. at 201. Thus Jackson's and Scott's oversight is not from inattention to this ineffi-
ciency, but from their reluctance to realize that the inefficiency is unnecessary. See infra
part III.B.
165 Saul Levmore similarly argues in defense of secured credit and against the sug-
gestion that the law should permit only general creditors. Levmore, supra note 156.
Levmore builds on the work ofJackson & Kronman, supra note 89.
166 See supra notes 80, 156 and accompanying text.
167 A possible counterargument to the text's conclusion is that a bankruptcy court
can efficiently subordinate a senior claim if the court limits such subordination to cases
in which the senior claimant has misbehaved. A court could, for example, subordinate a
creditor's claim if the creditor terminated a line of credit, not because the debtor posed
an unacceptable credit risk, but because the creditor sought extracontractual payments
from the debtor for a new line of credit. Inasmuch as the creditor and the debtor's
management would not have agreed at the time of the creditor's initial investment to
allow such strategic behavior, the court's subordination of the creditor's claim in this
illustration would serve the collective interests of the investors. This defense of reallo-
cation fails, however. A contract is nothing more than an agreement. So in this illustra-
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An additional inefficiency of reallocation arises when a secured
creditor becomes a senior investor because of its particular sensitiv-
ity to the risk of the debtor's insolvency.' 68 In such a case, bank-
ruptcy reallocation shifts risk of loss to a party disinclined to bear it.
As a result, such a secured creditor will charge more to bear insol-
vency risk than junior investors, general creditors, and equity wish
to pay for the reallocation.169 Once again, bankruptcy reallocation
hinders a mutually beneficial agreement. 170
b. In Avoidance of Bankruptcy
Just as compulsory contract terms prevent efficient contractual
arrangements, rules that increase the expense of an efficient con-
tractual arrangement discourage that arrangement and sacrifice net
benefit.' 7 ' To address exclusively those costs that arise in bank-
ruptcy would, therefore, underestimate bankruptcy reallocation
costs. A proper account includes the efficiency losses to firms that
never enter bankruptcy but operate inefficiently so as to avoid the
risk of costs that result from bankruptcy's reallocative provisions.
To avoid bankruptcy's unnecessarily high costs, a firm may, for ex-
ample, abjure valuable debt in its corporate structure, or forego a
risky but potentially lucrative investment opportunity. 7 2 These
missed occasions for profit are bankruptcy reallocation costs, even
though the firms that bear them never enter bankruptcy.
B. Bankruptcy Reallocation's Illusory Benefits
To critique risk-sharing theory, one might now speculate
whether the purported benefits of risk-sharing outweigh the costs of
bankruptcy reallocation. Ultimately, however, such speculation is
don, for example, either the creditor had no contractual right to terminate the line of
credit (in which case the subordination is not a reallocation) or the creditor did have the
contractual right to terminate (in which case it is impossible to say that the debtor's
management would not have agreed to grant the creditor such a right). See generally supra
part I.B.
168 For an explanation of secured credit's role, see White, supra note 163, at 473.
169 Risk-sharing theory presupposes that sensitivities to risk run the other way, from
the most sensitive junior investors to the least sensitive senior investors. This assump-
tion may stem from a misapplication of risk aversion analysis. See infra notes 173-79 and
accompanying text.
170 The proposition that all parties lose when regulation prohibits the freedom to
contract is not unique to secured finance. See Alan Schwartz, Justice and the Law of Con-
tracts: A Case for the Traditional Approach, 9 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 107 (1986); see also
Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2 v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook,J.) (arguing that unless pacts are enforced according to their terms,
the institution of contract is jeopardized); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys.,
Inc., 901 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that court will not supply an implied term
when the language of the contract is clear).
171 See authorities cited supra note 170.
172 See also supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary because bankruptcy reallocation as a vehicle for risk-
sharing furnishes only illusory benefits. First, risk-sharing theory's
misapplication of risk aversion analysis overstates risk-sharing's po-
tential benefits. Second, one should not compare the benefits of
risk-sharing to the costs of bankruptcy's reallocative provisions.
Only the actual benefitfrom those provisions matters. This important
distinction draws attention to reallocation alternatives that provide
the same benefits at a lower cost.
In any case, even if one assumes for the sake of argument that
some form of bankruptcy reallocation is in some way justifiable,
bankruptcy's actual reallocative provisions, reorganization most no-
tably, are unjustifiable.
1. Limited Benefits
Bankruptcy's reallocative provisions provide benefits, if at all,
to a strictly limited class of investors, because the benefits from risk-
sharing accrue exclusively to those investors who bear undiversified
risk. Only manager-equity investors are likely to bear a heavy bur-
den of undiversified risk. Most other investors diversify their wealth
and shed risk related to a particular firm in order to maximize the
value of their investments. Even trade creditors who cannot diver-
sify across industries will diversify their investments through a port-
folio of customers within an industry. Risk-sharing, therefore,
benefits only a small class of investors. Moreover, even under cir-
cumstances in which risk-sharing can plausibly provide benefits to
undiversified investors, bankruptcy's reallocative provisions are as
likely to harm as to' help such investors.
a. Firm-Specific Risk
Ordinary investors garner little benefit from risk-sharing. To
understand why, consider those insolvencies that are the product of
poor management or some other firm-specific characteristic, and are
not the product of an industry-wide or economy-wide downturn.
From the perspective of a potential equity investor or creditor, the
prospect of any one of these insolvencies is, by hypothesis, uncorre-
lated with any other. As a result, this insolvency risk is ordinarily no
risk at all. The risk disappears-is "diversified"-because an inves-
tor can purchase interests in or make loans to a large number of
firms and thus insulate itself from the failure of any one in particu-
lar.' 73 So insulated, the investor will not benefit from sharing risk
that is unique to any particular firm.




To illustrate, consider how a diversified junior investor, equity
or general creditor, views the unique risk of a debtor's insolvency in
a world with and then without bankruptcy's compulsory risk-
sharing. From the investor's perspective, bankruptcy reallocation
alters contractual priority to the benefit of junior claims and may,
therefore, increase the likelihood that the investor will get a return
from each firm in which it invests. The investor, however, must pay
a higher price for its interest in each firm in exchange for that higher
expected return. That is, the investor must pay a premium for this
insurance against bankruptcy. In an efficient market, the price of
the insurance will offset the present value of the increased expected
returns. This offset ensures that the net value of the investor's port-
folio is no higher with a risk-sharing regime than it is without one.
Thus risk-sharing is in net valueless here even if risk-sharing is
costless.
This conclusion is unaltered by the probability that the investor
is risk averse, because the total expected return on the diversified
investor's portfolio remains unchanged regardless of the insurance
afforded by bankruptcy reallocation. Each diversified investor esti-
mates the likelihood of a typical firm's insolvency and incorporates
this estimate into its anticipated portfolio insolvency rate. Thus the
investor bases its investment on the probability that a large portion
of the firms in its portfolio will remain solvent despite its uncertainty
as to which particular firms will become insolvent. As a result of this
fixed probability of success, risk aversion becomes irrelevant. 174 No
investor will pay to avoid risk that it does not bear in any case. 175
Consequently, with respect to firm-specific risk, even risk-averse,
well-diversified, equity investors and general creditors would abjure
a risk-sharing regime with some expense, no matter how little, be-
174 For a more concrete example, consider the relative prices of investments A, B,
and C. Investment A: The immediate right to receive a certain $5000. Investment B:
The immediate right to receive $10,000 ifa single toss of a fair coin lands heads. Invest-
ment C: The immediate right to receive $.01 for each time a tossed fair coin lands heads
in one million tosses (to occur simultaneously). Any investor, of course, will pay $5000
for Investment A. A risk-averse investor will pay less than $5000 for Investment B, be-
cause, by hypothesis, a risk-averse investor will demand compensation for the risk that it
will receive nothing. But the same risk-averse investor will pay almost exactly $5000 for
Investment C, not because the number of tosses reduces its risk aversion, but because
there is almost no probability that the one million tosses will produce a payoff signifi-
cantly less than $5000.
175 For a full description of the capital asset pricing model, which includes and
builds on the advantages of diversification, see, e.g., EDWIN J. ELTON & MARTIN J. GRU-
BER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1984); HAIM LEVY &
MARSHALL SARNAT, PORTFOLIO AND INVESTMENT SELECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1984); Modigliani & Pogue, supra note 77. For a good summary, see BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 8, at 149-66.
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cause such investors garner no benefit from the regime.17 6 All costs
of bankruptcy's reallocative provisions are wasted to the extent. they
serve to limit firm-specific risk.
Risk-sharing theorists do not ignore the significance of diversifi-
cation as a substitute for bankruptcy reallocation. 17 7 Indeed, a prin-
cipal justification for risk-sharing is the benefit to a debtor managed
by an undiversified equity investor.178 But risk-sharing theory posits
that the benefits of risk-sharing extend beyond the limited category
of the manager equity investor. Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott
pose the case of a trade creditor, a lumber supplier, whose business
requires that it extend credit to debtors in a single industry. As a
result, concentrated investment in the lumber industry sensitizes the
supplier to the risk that insolvencies will pervade that industry re-
gardless of whether the supplier is well diversified in its loans within
that industry. From this Jackson and Scott conclude: "As long as a
significant group of the participants in the [hypothetical creditors']
bargain are thus rendered risk averse, a risk-sharing scheme will be
a plausible strategy, even where other claimants are fully diversified
and risk neutral."1 79
The flaw in the Jackson and Scott analysis is subtle but impor-
tant. Their conclusion blurs the distinction between risk aversion
and risk diversification. Even fully diversified investors are risk-
averse. Those investors, however, are fully diversified with respect
to a particular outcome, and no longer bear the risk of that out-
come. Because the investors spread the expected cost across a
number of investments, they gain a fixed rate of return. The lumber
supplier's aversion to risk has nothing to do with its ties to a single
industry. While those ties may be significant sources of risk sensitiv-
ity when the risk stems from an industry-wide downturn, they do not
bear at all on the supplier's sensitivity to uncorrelated insolvency
risk within an industry, which the supplier can eliminate through di-
versification of its loans within that industry. Consequently, if
industry-wide insolvency risk, correlated with the economy, is small
relative to the wholly firm-specific insolvency risk that stems from
mismanagement or isolated disaster, general creditors may benefit
little from risk-sharing, bankruptcy-induced or otherwise, despite
any inability to diversify across industries.
176 See supra note 174.
177 See Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 175.
178 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.




Ordinary investors can shed not only firm-specific risk, but, in
theory, all risk that is uncorrelated with general trends in the econ-
omy. An investor could, for example, purchase a portfolio of diver-
sified equity interests in and debt obligations of firms in all
industries. Such an investor would be indifferent to even a costless
risk-sharing regime regardless of the insolvency risk's source. No
risk-sharing regime could reduce such an investor's "systematic"
risk of an economy-wide downturn, and, as a benefit of diversifica-
tion, the investor bears no firm-specific risk.1t 0
Not all investors, however, can afford full diversification and
some may benefit from risk-sharing. These investors may include
the manager equity investor and, when the source of insolvency risk
encompasses all sources, investors such as Jackson's and Scott's
lumber supplier. 8 t Suppose a lumber supplier is equipped only to
serve as a general creditor who deals exclusively in the lumber in-
dustry. The supplier would be sensitive to the risk that the industry
might decline, and would prefer to shed some of that risk.182 The
supplier, therefore, could benefit from a, transaction that reduces its
potential losses from a spate of lumber insolvencies.
Bankruptcy's reallocative provisions would generate beneficial
risk-sharing, even for such a creditor, however, only by mere
chance. Bankruptcy reallocation provides the supplier with relief
from risk only through the imposition of risk on other creditors,
such as secured creditors denied pendency reimbursement. There
is no reason to believe that the secured creditor can bear the risk
any more efficiently than the supplier. The secured creditor may
well be more sensitive to risk than the supplier. Perhaps the secured
creditor is an undiversified manufacturer of the property that serves
as its collateral and is itself a debtor with significant obligations. If
so, the secured creditor could be more risk averse and less well di-
versified than the supplier. Indeed, the secured creditor's higher
sensitivity to risk might have led the secured creditor to bargain for
a security interest in the first instance. Bankruptcy reallocation,
therefore, might often reallocate risk in a counterproductive fash-
ion. The threat of such a shift would lead to adjustments in interest
180 See sources cited supra note 175.
181 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
182 The undiversified creditor would receive an unsatisfactory return for the risk that
a significant portion of its debtors may become insolvent simultaneously. This unsatis-
factory return occurs because the covariance in value among the firms in which the sup-
plier invests is greater than the covariance in value among firms in the economy
generally. The supplier would do better were it not constrained to a single industry and
could invest in a more diversified "market" portfolio and, perhaps, risk-free government
securities. For a further discussion of this point, see sources cited supra note 175.
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rates to include a risk "premium" that neither equity investors nor
general creditors would choose to pay if bankruptcy were to permit
them to contract freely.' 8 3
Risk-sharing theorists assume, nonetheless, that a firm's inves-
tors would collectively agree to have a secured creditor "share with
unsecured creditors and equity some of the asset pool otherwise re-
served to them" in the event of insolvency.'8 4 Perhaps this assump-
tion is a product of a misapprehension that a secured creditor is
risk-neutral.18 5 In fact, a secured creditor is more likely than any
creditor to be risk-averse. A fully secured creditor, like a fully diver-
sified creditor, simply bears little or no risk. Each may well be quite
averse to the prospect that it will suffer unexpected losses. This may
indeed be why each is careful to avoid risk through diversification or
collateral, as in the illustration above.
In sum, a large number of investors, relatively well equipped to
bear risk, receive no benefit from bankruptcy reallocations. Bank-
ruptcy reallocation, moreover, often interferes with deliberate con-
tractual risk allocation. Thus even if bankruptcy reallocation does
provide some benefit to manager-equity investors, risk-sharing the-
orists overestimate reallocation's total benefit. The discussion
could proceed from here to an analysis of how bankruptcy's reallo-
cative provisions could be narrowly tailored to produce benefits.
But such a discussion becomes unnecessary on closer analysis,
which reveals that all purported benefits are illusory.' 8 6
2. Contractual Risk-Sharing
Bankruptcy reallocation benefits no one, because a bankruptcy
process that abandons reorganization and honors absolute priority
would allow investors to accomplish risk-sharing at a fraction of the
cost that bankruptcy reallocation imposes. Recall that bankruptcy
law could in theory replace reorganization with a forced auction of
the insolvent debtor and the distribution of proceeds in strict accord
with contractual priorities.' 87 This procedure would sacrifice bank-
ruptcy's reallocative tendencies. However, the elimination of bank-
ruptcy's reallocation function would not foreclose the possibility of
any risk-sharing advantage. Investors can accomplish risk-sharing
with a simple set of contracts. A manager-equity investor can, for
example, receive compensation in or purchase debt obligations of
the firm she manages. This would reduce the manager's losses if the
183 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
184 Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 168.
185 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
186 Part III.B.3. discusses alternative bankruptcy reallocation rules.
187 See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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firm failed,""' and would dampen the manager's eve-of-bankruptcy
incentive to risk the debtor's assets.18 9 To illustrate, assume that
instead of an initial equity investment of $100,000 and a loan from
an outsider of $100,000, a manager equity investor contributes only
$90,000 in equity and makes a $10,000 loan to the debtor along
with the outsider's $100,000 loan.190 If the debtor suffers a financial
setback and is sold at public auction forjust less than $100,000, ab-
solute priority would provide the equity investor with nothing in the
former capitalization, but with about $9000 in the latter. The latter
structure, then, allows the equity investor to share assets in the
event of the debtor's insolvency, and provides an incentive to tread
more carefully with those assets. 191
Contractual risk-sharing is not merely an alternative to bank-
ruptcy's reallocative provisions, it is the superior alternative. Unlike
bankruptcy's reallocative provisions, a capital structure that includes
managers as creditors provides insurance against failure and any
beneficial eve-of-bankruptcy incentive without the costs of uncer-
tainty, delay, contract abrogation, and strategic behavior. More-
over, such a capital structure does not suffer from bankruptcy
reallocation's tendency to exacerbate endogenous risk in prein-
solvency time periods. The contractual solution is superior in this
respect because a manager holds the contractual debt investment
whether or not she invests the solvent debtor's assets in an unduly
risky project. In contrast, bankruptcy reallocation not only insulates
the manager from risk, it effectively rewards the manager with her
insolvency share if she invests the debtor's assets in the foolish
project. 192
188 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
190 Equity's investment in debt, which provides risk-sharing in bankruptcy, appears
occasionally in highly leveraged corporations, where bankruptcy risk is presumably
great. See Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2J. EcON. PERSPEC-
TrvEs 21 (1988).
191 Even a narrow interpretation of the equitable subordination doctrine could pre-
vent this arrangement, because the manager-equity investor is an insider. See supra part
I.B. The doctrine should not, however, work to subordinate any arms-length transaction,
even one involving an insider.
192 See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. Another example will further
clarify this difference. Assume a widely-held firm has $100 million in assets and $90
million in outstanding debt, leaving a $10 million equity cushion. Assume further that
management has an opportunity to have the debtor invest $10 million in a project that
has an equal chance of a $19 million payoff or a total loss. The project has a negative
expected value of $500,000. Thus the investors collectively would not have the debtor
invest in the project. If bankruptcy honored contractual priority, management would act
in the best interest of the investors and would not have the debtor invest in the project.
This is so whether the managers own only equity in the debtor or own some of the
debtor's debt obligations. If the managers own only equity, they will not have the
debtor invest, because the managers would expect to lose 5% of their total investment
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If risk-sharing establishes benefits, then, contractual risk-
sharing is the most efficient means to achieve them. Recall, how-
ever, that risk-sharing theorists assume contractual risk-sharing is
impractical. One account of the impracticality stems from the "for-
midable operational difficulties in distinguishing common risks from
those that have been assigned to individual claimants." 193 The eq-
uity investor who becomes a creditor, and thus partially insures him-
self against financial disaster, does become insured against both
endogenous risk of failure due to his own indolence or incompe-
tence, and exogenous risk of failure due to circumstances beyond
his control. But bankruptcy's reallocative provisions suffer the same
inability to distinguish between endogenous risk, for which creditors
would not endorse insurance, and exogenous risk, for which they
might.194
There is another explanation for contractual risk-sharing's im-
practicality: manager-equity investors could trade away any debt
obligation that they initially agree to purchase, and thereby "undo"
the beneficial capital structure. The manager-equity investor would
so act in order to regain her ability to gamble the debtor's assets at
in the firm. If the managers hold 10% of their investments in debt obligations, they also
will not have the debtor invest, because the managers would expect to lose again, this
time $4.50 out of every $100 they have invested. (If the managers' investments consist
of 9/10 debt-the firm's debt to asset ratio-the managers would expect to lose $.50 on
every $100 invested. This, of course, is the firm's loss ratio for this project.) If, how-
ever, the investors collectively rely for risk-sharing on bankruptcy reallocation, and such
reallocation guarantees equity as little as 2.2% of the debtor's assets, management will
have an incentive to have the debtor invest in the project. This is because if the manag-
ers own only equity, the managers will expect to gain 5% of their total investment: that
is, they will expect to gain a share of a $9 million profit if the project succeeds and to
lose only a share of $8 million if the project fails. The $10 million thefirm would lose on
failure is not borne fully by equity because equity is guaranteed 2.2%, or $2 million, of
the $90 million in assets remaining after failure.
193 Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 168. See also supra Part II. The discussion in the
text assumes for the sake of argument that these difficulties are insurmountable. It is
not wholly obvious, however, that they are. "To tie sharing to exogenous risks, the
[creditor's] contract could trigger the sharing (no interest, payment in stock, or forced
conversion to equity) if demand in the industry falls to [a specified] level of production
or price." Roe, supra note 4, at 223. Roe further argues that the absence of such explicit
contracts suggests investors may not wish to share even exogenous risk. He points to
informational asymmetries as the source of their desires to allocate such risk to individ-
ual investors. Id. at 222-29. The text points out, however, that risk-sharing theory is
insupportable, even when Roe is incorrect.
194 Creditors would not accept insurance against endogenous risk, because creditors
fear that, so insured, a manager-equity investor would have too little incentive to man-
age wisely. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. This is sometimes called a fear
of"moral hazard." Mark Roe also observes that bankruptcy's imposed risk-sharing does
not solve this problem: "The moral hazard does not disappear simply because the mor-
ally hazardous term is written into the contract by bankruptcy law rather than through
contract negotiation." Roe, supra note 4, at 231.
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the creditors' expense.' 9 5 This ostensible danger has a simple solu-
tion. Managers could bond themselves against misbehavior with an
investment in restricted debt obligations that would be enforceable
only so long as the manager serves the firm. In fact, the issuance of
restricted securities is common.'9 6
Thus bankruptcy's reallocative provisions appear to be no more
than a complex and costly way to accomplish that which investors
can achieve more cheaply on their own. 197 Perhaps certain investors
do not contract for risk-sharing because managers already receive
some compensation in the form of fixed salary and would acquire
from risk-sharing incentives that are too closely aligned with those of
creditors. 98 For that reason, or any other, the investors collectively
may simply find risk-sharing not in their best-interests.
195 See Frierman & Viswanath, supra note 5. See also supra notes 83-86 and accompa-
nying text.
196 One example of restricted securities is "phantom stock." Under a phantom
stock plan, a firm issues to its manager units that correspond to shares of stock. The
firm credits the manager with dividends and increases in the value of the stock as these
amounts accrue until the manager retires. Simple inalienable stock options perform
much the same function. See RiBSTEIN, supra note 34.
197 Despite his significant criticism, see supra note 193, Roe ultimately argues that
risk-sharing theory is at least plausible. The ground for this defense is that equity may
be unable to contract for insurance against exogenous risk because equity's acceptance
of such insurance would signal to creditors that equity is likely to expose the creditors to
endogenous risk. Bankruptcy-imposed sharing, the explanation concludes, allows an
equity investor to insure against exogenous risk without the cost of the destructive sig-
nal. Roe, supra note 4, at 231-33. Roe's defense of risk-sharing theory, however, does
not withstand scrutiny. Bankruptcy's imposition of sharing does not eliminate a false
signal that a debtor suffers from heightened endogenous risk. The imposed sharing
instead ensures that a heightened risk exists for all debtors. This saves the risk-sensitive
equity investor from the need disadvantageously to distinguish herself, but it causes all
debtors to become bad risks. Imagine a law that prohibits traffic signals in all communi-
ties. Could anyone defend such a law on the ground that it saves communities without
traffic signals the unflattering appearance of relatively dangerous intersections? Roe
himself refers to this problem. Id. at 233. But he does not conclude that the problem
necessarily disqualifies signalling as a justification for bankruptcy's reallocative provi-
sions. Despite his reluctance, it is difficult to escape such a conclusion.
198 One might speculate, for example, that a debtor's nonmanager-equity investors
do not wish managers to hold debt, because such debt might encourage indolence and
discourage risk, even risk justified by a higher return. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note
7, at 312-13. For their part, creditors might consent to control management's perverse
risk incentives through restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Avner Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder
Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J. FIN. EcoN. 211 (1982); Clifford Smith & Jerold
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7J. FIN. EcoN. 117 (1979).
Managers' interests, moreover, are well aligned with those of creditors even without an
ordinary credit investment, at least preinsolvency, because the managers hold fixed sal-
ary claims and firm-specific human capital investments. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk
Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20J. LEGAL SrUD. 277 (1991).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
3. Proceeds Reallocation
Finally, assume for the sake of argument that some bankruptcy
reallocative provisions are necessary to accomplish risk-sharing, and
that bankruptcy-imposed risk-sharing is worth its costs of ineffi-
ciency in compulsory contract terms.1 99 Not even these ill-
supported assumptions justify bankruptcy's actual reallocative pro-
visions, most significantly, bankruptcy reorganization.
As an alternative to reorganization and its substantial costs, 200
bankruptcy could impose risk-sharing features on the distribution of
sale proceeds after the court auctioned a debtor free of all prebank-
ruptcy claims. In their exposition of risk-sharing theory, Jackson
and Scott recognize this possibility, but argue that once bankruptcy
abandons contractual priority, "something like the rules found in
[bankruptcy's reorganization provisions] are necessarily reintro-
duced.... If that is so, not much would have been gained by resort-
ing to [the auction] and then introducing risk-sharing rules into the
distributional process." 20' This response is not persuasive. An in-
expensive and effective mechanical risk-sharing rule may be suffi-
ciently certain to discourage costly negotiation or litigation. Such a
rule might, for example, require creditors to sacrifice some fixed
percent of their claim to a general fund in which equity would share.
In addition to negotiation and litigation savings, such a rule would
eliminate the "disruption" of the debtor's operations that results
from reorganization. 20 2 Disruption cannot be a cost of postauction
risk-sharing, because the auction frees the debtor from prebank-
ruptcy claims against it. As a result, the imbroglio among claimants
over a debtor becomes, at worst, an imbroglio over a pot of cash,
which even the most bitter conflict cannot easily diminish. 203
199 See supra notes 100-72 and accompanying text.
200 Id.
201 Jackson & Scott, supra note 4, at 191 n.84.
202 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
203 A related advantage to certainty in reallocation has its source outside of risk-
sharing. This advantage arises when an insolvent debtor possesses going-concern sur-
plus derived largely from a synergy between manager equity investors and the debtor's
assets. A rule that, in the extreme, awards the entire value of the debtor to equity is, ex
post, the most efficient rule because it avoids costly negotiation and strategic behavior.
See supra part I.B. A mirror-image rule that awards the entire value of the firm to the
creditors as senior claimants does not similarly eliminate strategic behavior costs, be-
cause for the creditors to realize the debtor's full value, they would in any case need to
negotiate with equity for equity's managerial skills. An argument similar to this one
appears, as part of a discussion on the new value exception to the absolute priority rule,
in Baird & Picker, supra note 52, at 344-47. This argument is not, however, a defense of
bankruptcy reallocation. It is rather an observation that postinsolvency strategic behav-





There is no good reason for bankruptcy to alter nonbankruptcy
contractual priorities. Although risk-sharing theory proposes that
bankruptcy reallocation of contractual entitlement from high-
priority to low-priority investors mitigates equity's prebankruptcy
incentive to risk the debtor's assets and serves a valuable insurance
function for low-priority investors, bankruptcy reallocation may well
exacerbate, not temper, the problems of prebankruptcy behavior
and uninsured risk. Contract, not mandatory rules, can most effec-
tively provide any conceivable benefit that bankruptcy reallocation
now provides, if at all, only at substantial cost to investors.
An important consequence of this conclusion is that there is no
need for bankruptcy reorganization, which serves no purpose other
than reallocation. Congress should repeal bankruptcy's reorganiza-
tion provisions. As a result of reorganization's exorcism, bank-
ruptcy could provide an easier and less costly resolution of business
insolvency.
Courts, moreover, can prevent the worst of the reallocation
abuses even under extant law if, whenever possible, the courts inter-
pret the law to respect contractual priorities. Unless the Supreme
Court reverses itself, there is little lower courts can do to reimburse
undersecured creditors for foregone pendency income. But courts
are free to eliminate the "new value" exception to contractual prior-
ity and cease "equitable" subordination of fairly negotiated claims.
Courts can also limit reallocation in the reorganization process if
they refuse to extend the period of management's exclusive right to
propose a plan, check their own tendency to overvalue debtors' as-
sets, refuse to confirm distributions to junior classes over senior
class dissent unless the debtor's assets defy market valuation, and
confirm only those reorganization plans that respect contractual pri-
ority in the distribution of a debtor's full going-concern value and
not merely its piecemeal liquidation value.20 4
In sum, a bankruptcy system that respects contractual priority is
equitable, more certain, and promotes greater economic efficiency,
than a system that gives free reign to the crude and costly tools of
compulsory risk-sharing.
204 Each proposal responds directly from the inefficiencies described supra part I.B.
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